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ABSTRACT
The shareholder primacy norm defines the objective of the corporation as
maximization of shareholder wealth. Law and economics scholars have incorporated the
shareholder primacy norm into their empirical analyses of regulatory efficiency. An
increasingly influential body of scholarship uses empirical methodology to evaluate legal
rules that allocate power within the corporation. By embracing the shareholder primacy
*
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norm, empirical scholars offer normative assessments about regulatory choices based on
the effect of legal rules on measures of shareholder value such as stock price, net profits,
and Tobin’s Q.
This Article challenges the foundations of using the shareholder primacy norm to
judge corporate law. As this Article explains, existing legal doctrine and economic theory
provide only limited support for shareholder primacy. Similarly, shareholder primacy
cannot be justified as a necessary consequence of existing limits on the enforcement of
management fiduciary duties. This Article demonstrates that, rather than defining the
corporation’s objectives, the limited scope of a fiduciary duty claim provides a
mechanism for institutional specialization in responding to the needs of different
corporate stakeholders. Comparative institutional analysis suggests that the courts are
uniquely positioned to protect the interests of shareholders in the context of interstakeholder conflicts. Implementation of this role through rules that grant shareholders a
unique degree of judicial access does not privilege the interests of shareholders in the
evaluation of firm value.
The presence of other stakeholders, whose interests in the firm may not be reflected
in an assessment of shareholder value, offers reasons to question the conclusions of
existing empirical research. In addition, the measures of shareholder value typically
employed by empirical scholars—particularly short-term stock price—are problematic as
indicators of firm value and may reinforce inappropriate managerial decisions. This
Article maintains that empirical scholars need to offer better and explicit justifications for
their reliance on shareholder wealth and, more importantly, for their argument that
shareholder wealth effects should dominate regulatory policy.
I. INTRODUCTION
In many ways, Robert Clark’s 1986 analysis of the shareholder primacy norm could
have been written today. 1 Chapter 16 of Clark’s treatise, Corporate Law, describes five
clusters of views concerning the proper role and objectives of the corporation. 2 Citing
strengths and weaknesses of each approach, Clark warns of the peril of attempting to
choose among them. 3
Twenty years have passed since the publication of Corporate Law. Nonetheless, the
debate over the shareholder primacy norm continues. At one end of the spectrum are
those commentators who argue that a corporation’s sole goal should be the maximization
of shareholder wealth; at the other are those who argue that the corporation should be
managed in the interests of a broad range of stakeholders. 4
Much has changed, however, in the past 20 years. Since Clark published his treatise
1. ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 675-703 (1986).
2. Id. at 677.
3. Id. at 702.
4. Steve Bainbridge describes shareholder primacy as encompassing “two distinct principles: 1) the
shareholder wealth maximization norm . . . and 2) the principle of ultimate shareholder control.” Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 573
(2003). A third and related principle is that shareholder primacy defines the beneficiaries of judicially
enforceable fiduciary duties by management. In his analysis of director primacy, Bainbridge focuses on the
second principle—the extent of manager versus shareholder control. Id. at 574. In contrast, this Article focuses
on the first and third principles and, particularly in Part III, on the relationship between the two.
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in 1986, an entire chapter of corporate law concerning the rights and powers of
managements, shareholders, and other stakeholders in the context of control contests has
been written and refined. Corporations have experimented with new methods of
management compensation, including the dramatic rise in executive stock options. 5
Institutional investors have become increasingly important—and increasingly active—
equity holders. These changes, and many others, have affected the allocation of power
among corporate constituencies and, in turn, given new importance to evaluating the
effects of this allocation of power upon firm value and social welfare.
An explosion of empirical analysis of corporate law—also an important
development since 1986—has responded to this demand. 6 An increasing number of
scholars in law, economics, finance, and related fields are using event studies, regression
analysis, and other statistical tools to evaluate the effect of corporate law on firm value.
The normative framework for this work is efficiency analysis. 7 The studies seek to
identify as efficient those legal rules that maximize firm value and, on the basis of this
efficiency analysis, to offer concrete evidence to guide lawmakers with respect to
regulatory choices such as the allocation of authority between shareholders and directors,
or the scope of a litigation remedy for corporate misconduct.
Empirical scholars have embraced the shareholder primacy norm. Although the
studies frequently fail to define firm value explicitly, they incorporate the concept of
shareholder primacy by evaluating legal rules in terms of their effect on measures of
shareholder value such as stock price and Tobin’s Q. Consequently, the resulting
efficiency analysis evaluates regulatory efficiency in terms of shareholder wealth.
Shareholder wealth may be an appropriate proxy for a broader conception of firm
value. Alternatively, shareholder wealth may simply be the normatively appropriate basis
for evaluating the efficiency of corporate law. However, most existing empirical studies
do not justify their reliance on shareholder wealth in these terms. Indeed, most studies do
not expressly consider the implications of using shareholder wealth as a measure of firm
value, despite the fact that they purport to be conducting a general efficiency analysis in
which the primary goal should be maximizing the size of the corporate surplus, while

5. See, e.g., Brian J. Hall, Six Challenges in Designing Equity-Based Pay, 15 ACCENTURE J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 21, 23 (2003) (describing the rise in median equity-based compensation of executives at S&P 500
companies from 0% in 1984 to 66% in 2001).
6. See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas, The Increasing Role of Empirical Research in Corporate Law
Scholarship, 92 GEO. L.J. 981, 982-83 (2004) (reviewing MARK ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINATES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003)) (identifying the “explosion” in
new corporate law empirical scholarship).
7. The Article consciously adopts the normative framework of welfare economics and efficiency
analysis, excluding, for purposes of this discussion, independent considerations of equity or fairness. See, e.g.,
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 968 (2001) (offering a
definition of welfare economics and distinguishing fairness considerations). Within this framework, the
applicable standard is Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. See Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, LAW AND ECONOMICS 4344 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining Kaldor-Hicks efficiency). Economists commonly argue that distributional concerns
can be addressed through tax and transfer policies, although this claim has been criticized both generally and
with respect to corporate law. See Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes and Employee
Governance, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1227, 1254-55 (2004) (questioning the goal of Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency in corporate law); see also Chris W. Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 1003 (2001) (advocating equity-informed legal rules).
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considerations of the appropriate division of the corporate surplus should be secondary. 8
Clark recognized the problems inherent in various attempts to specify the corporate
objective, concluding that an effort to choose among the different conceptions was likely
to be “inconsequential or misguided.” 9 Despite Clark’s rational skepticism, current
scholars have overwhelmingly embraced the shareholder primacy norm. This Article
explores the justifications for this choice, focusing in particular on the implications of
incorporating the shareholder primacy norm into empirical research.
This Article begins, in Part II, by demonstrating the centrality of the shareholder
primacy norm to the evaluation of regulatory efficiency in corporate law. This Article
focuses on the premise of most empirical research—that firm value is equivalent to
shareholder wealth—and argues that scholars have failed to justify this premise. Part III
explores the extent to which reliance on shareholder primacy can be justified in terms of
existing law, practice, or economic theory. Part IV considers the specific subject of
fiduciary duties and argues that, while there are compelling reasons to favor shareholder
primacy as a limit on the scope of legally enforceable fiduciary duties, the scope of
fiduciary duties does not offer a basis for defining the corporate objective exclusively in
terms of shareholder wealth. Part V identifies possible concerns in premising efficiency
analysis on the shareholder primacy norm. In particular, Part V observes that measures of
shareholder wealth are poorly suited to capture certain issues of particular importance to
corporate regulation, such as transfers of wealth between corporate stakeholders,
externalities, and the appropriate level of risk-taking.
Ultimately, corporate scholarship must confront the appropriate definition of firm
value for purposes of efficiency analysis. Although the appropriate corporate objective
may be the maximization of shareholder wealth, scholars have not yet made the case.
Consequently, empirical analyses of shareholder wealth may not support the efficiency
conclusions offered by their authors, particularly when the subjects of the analyses are
legal rules that allocate rights among competing corporate constituencies, rules that
impose externalities on other corporations, or rules that affect the overall level of risk
borne by the corporation’s stakeholders. If this is the case, the challenge for future
empirical scholars is to develop methods by which to incorporate a broader conception of
firm value into their research.
II. EFFICIENCY IN CORPORATE LAW AND THE MAXIMIZATION OF SHAREHOLDER WEALTH
Easterbrook and Fischel posed a fundamental question almost 15 years ago: “Is
corporate law efficient or not?” 10 As Randall Thomas has observed, corporate legal
scholarship has, in recent years, increasingly sought to answer that question through
empirical research. 11 Some scholars have used event studies to measure the effect of
specific regulatory changes. 12 The purpose of these studies is to assess the effect of a

8. Cf. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7-11 (3d ed. 2003)
(defining efficient legal rules as those that maximize aggregate social welfare).
9. CLARK, supra note 1, at 702.
10. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
212 (1991).
11. Thomas, supra note 6, at 982.
12. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES
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particular legal rule or component of corporate structure on firm value. 13 Thus, for
example, Michael Bradley and Cindy Schipani examined the effect on stock prices of
new legislation permitting corporations to limit or eliminate director liability for
violations of the duty of care. They concluded that, because adoption of director
exculpation statutes resulted in lower stock prices, the statutes inefficiently lowered firm
value. 14 Similarly, Jonathan Karpoff and Paul Malatesta studied the adoption of second
generation antitakeover statutes, finding a small negative effect on stock prices. 15
Other studies analyze firm-specific differences to compare the effect of variations in
firm structure. Bernard Black and Sanjai Bhagat studied the impact of board
independence on firm performance. 16 Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick constructed a
corporate governance index to measure the aggregate effect of a variety of governance
mechanisms—including many takeover defenses—on firm value. 17 Roberta Romano
analyzed the effect of confidential voting and determined that it does not affect firm
performance. 18
Still others have compared legal regimes, most commonly Delaware versus other
states. Interstate comparisons are useful in evaluating the debate over regulatory
competition as well as seeking to explain why most large public companies are
incorporated in Delaware. 19 For example, Rob Daines and Guhan Subramanian have
both attempted to evaluate the efficiency of Delaware law, relative to that of other states,
by looking at the correlation between Delaware incorporation and firm value. 20 The
influence of these studies is substantial: the Wall Street Journal prominently reported
REGULATION 64-70 (2002) (describing the use of event studies in evaluating corporate law).
13. Most commonly, studies seek to evaluate the effect of a legal rule on firm value, using stock price or
Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm value. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of a firm's stock market value to the book value of
its assets. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL.
L. REV. 1775, 1785 (2002) (defining Tobin’s Q). In theory, there should be a strong correlation between stock
price and long-run returns to stockholders. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 10, at 18-20 (exploring
the extent to which stock price reflects a firm’s current and future value). But see Robert Dean Ellis, Equity
Derivatives, Executive Compensation, and Agency Costs, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 399, 416 n.64 (1998) (reporting
study results finding a correlation of only .4859 between cumulative returns and return on equity).
Alternatively, some studies seek to examine performance, a flow-type variable, rather than focusing on a static
variable such as value. The finance literature has considered extensively the extent to which performance is
correlated with value, as well as the most appropriate measure of performance. See id. (reporting a study finding
a correlation of only 0.2386 between shareholder returns and pre-tax profits); see also infra Part V (discussing
methods of evaluating firm performance).
14. Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Economic Importance of the Business Judgment Rule: An
Empirical Analysis of the Trans Union Decision and Subsequent Delaware Legislation, in THE BATTLE FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 105 (Arnold W. Sametz ed., 1991) (finding that the passage of section 102(b)(7) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law actually lowered the value of Delaware corporations).
15. Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H. Malatesta, The Wealth Effects of Second Generation State Takeover
Legislation, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 291 (1989).
16. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term
Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002).
17. Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003).
18. Roberta Romano, Does Confidential Proxy Voting Matter?, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 465, 502-06 (2003).
19. See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061 (2000) (explaining the debate over regulatory competition and efforts to
explain Delaware’s dominance as the site of incorporation for large public companies).
20. Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 (2001); Guhan
Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 46 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32 (2004).
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Daines’s finding that Delaware firms were worth 5% more than firms incorporated
elsewhere. 21
Overall, these studies seek both to analyze specific legal rules and to identify the
best way to make corporate law. 22 Empirical studies have been widely cited in the debate
over regulatory competition, primarily to support Judge Winter’s claim that market
competition constrains management and produces efficient regulation—a so-called race
“to the top.” 23 Empirical research has been influential in debates over regulatory policy.
Surprisingly, however, this empirical research has failed to provide convincing answers
to many of the efficiency questions to which it has been directed.
For example, Guhan Subramanian’s study of Delaware incorporation, extending and
subsequent to the Daines study, found insufficient evidence that Delaware incorporation
was correlated with higher firm value. 24 Subramanian found first that the “Delaware
effect” was driven by small firms, and second that it disappeared during the period from
1997 to 2002. 25 Subramanian therefore concluded that Daines had failed to provide
convincing empirical support for the race-to-the-top theory. Relatedly, Roberta Romano
has reported that a number of event studies have found positive stock price effects
associated with reincorporation in Delaware, but that the several studies attempting to use
performance-based measures to evaluate the effect of incorporation have found “no
significant difference in accounting performance.” 26
Similarly, empirical studies of corporate governance reforms, such as independent
boards or board committees, have produced conflicting results. 27 Thus, for example, the
recent large sample, long-horizon study of the impact of board independence conducted
by Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black failed to find any correlation between board
independence and firm value or financial performance. 28 In contrast, Laura Lin has cited
research indicating a positive relationship between director independence and firm
performance. 29

21. Steven Lipin, Deals & Deal Makers: Firms Incorporated in Delaware Are Valued More by Investors,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2000, at C21.
22. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON.
383 (2003) (suggesting that, because Delaware faces very limited competition for out-of-state corporations,
existing market pressure may be insufficient to produce efficient legal rules); cf. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s
Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003) (identifying the role of potential federal override as a constraint on
state corporate law).
23. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The Development of the Law of Corporate Governance, 9 DEL J. CORP. L. 524,
528 (1984).
24. Subramanian, supra note 20, at 57.
25. Id.
26. ROMANO, supra note 12, at 72-73.
27. See Jill Fisch & Caroline Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee: Using the Attorney
Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors, 53 DUKE L.J. 517, 559-63 (2003) (summarizing empirical
studies).
28. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard S. Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and LongTerm Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002). Bhagat and Black used a variety of variables to measure
firm value and performance, including Tobin’s Q, return on assets, ratio of sales to assets, and market-adjusted
stock price. Id. at 242. They also tested their results with other accounting measures such as sales per employee
and cash flow. Id.
29. Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories
and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 922 (1996).
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The absence of more definitive results from empirical research may be due to
methodological weaknesses. Commentators have offered many criticisms of the design
and methodology of corporate empirical research. 30 Critics have noted, for example, that
event studies and other studies that use stock price may depend on unrealistically strong
assumptions about the efficiency of the markets. Some scholars have identified
weaknesses in the assumptions underlying the predicted stock market response to the
studied event. 31 Event studies depend critically upon identifying the appropriate event;
researchers have argued that, in some cases, studies are not focusing on the correct event.
The financial literature is replete with debates over the most appropriate tools for
measuring firm performance. Economists have also identified flaws in the use of Tobin’s
Q, particularly with respect to the method used to measure the replacement cost of firm
assets. 32
To date, however, scholars have not focused on one core aspect of corporate
empirical research: its equation of firm value with shareholder value. 33 As Subramanian
states, commentators share common assumptions that the social welfare goal under
analysis is maximization of shareholder wealth. 34 The empirical studies uniformly
evaluate corporate law in terms of its impact on a shareholder-based component of
corporate value. Whether the variable used is net profits, stock price, or Tobin’s Q, in
each case, the authors are determining efficiency by reference to shareholder wealth. The
design of the studies is premised on the conclusion that efficient corporate rules are those
rules that maximize returns to shareholders.
Within a framework of welfare economics in which the goal is societal wealth
maximization, firm value is conceptually distinct from shareholder value. 35 Corporations
provide value to a variety of nonshareholder groups, including managers, employees,
creditors, customers, and suppliers. A corporation provides value to its creditors in the
form of interest on and repayment of its debt. It provides value to managers and other
employees through jobs that yield compensation, fringe benefits, perquisites, and, in
some cases, the development of specialized skills or marketable reputations. A
corporation provides value to its customers and its suppliers through voluntary surplusproducing market transactions. 36
30. For an overview of methodological weaknesses common to empirical research conducted by legal
scholars, see Lee Epstein & Gary King, Exchange: Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal Scholarship, 69
U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002).
31. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz, Comment, A Verdict on Corporate Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit:
Not Proven, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 344, 346-47 (1986) (questioning study’s prediction about the predicted stock
market response to announcements about derivative litigation).
32. See, e.g., Wilbur Lewellen & S.G. Badrinath, On the Measurement of Tobin’s Q., 44 J. FIN. ECON. 77
(1997) (finding flawed methodology in common computations of Tobin’s Q and proposing an alternative
approach).
33. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 113
(1987) (describing “the maximization of equity share prices as the core goal of corporation law”).
34. Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the
“Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1798 (2002).
35. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition
in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1485 (1992) (observing that, because “a given corporate law issue
. . . implicates not only the interests of shareholders, but also those of third parties . . . these [third party]
interests must be taken into account in arriving at the socially optimal rule).
36. Corporations may also provide value to the communities in which they are located, through the
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Firm value will, by its nature, exceed shareholder value because most or all of the
value provided to nonshareholder stakeholders, in the form of salaries, interest payments,
and so forth, is explicitly excluded from shareholder-oriented concepts of firm value such
as corporate profit. Similarly, because it is distributed to nonshareholder stakeholders,
this excess does not affect shareholder returns and ultimately will not be reflected in
stock price. Empirical studies that measure efficiency in terms of shareholder wealth
therefore exclude the effect of regulatory changes on nonshareholder constituencies
within the corporation.
Why do empirical analyses of the efficiency of corporate law focus on shareholder
wealth? There are several possible explanations. First, data on shareholder wealth,
particularly changes in market capitalization, are easy to obtain. Although empirical
research could probably incorporate a reasonable measure of creditor value, based on
something like the market value of publicly traded corporate debt, 37 neither the legal nor
the financial literature has developed standardized measures of employee value, customer
value, and so forth. 38 Second, researchers may believe shareholder wealth is a reasonably
good proxy for firm value. Even if shareholder wealth does not reflect aggregate firm
value, if regulatory changes are likely to have a similar effect on all corporate
constituencies—that is, if shareholder wealth is closely correlated with firm value—any
error resulting from the use of shareholder wealth is likely to be small. Third, because
corporate and securities law focus on the role and rights of investors, scholars may
believe that the effect of changes in corporate law on nonshareholder constituencies may
legitimately be disregarded for purposes of their analysis. 39
If researchers have focused on shareholder wealth because of the relative ease of
data collection, the consequence may be merely that some of their conclusions are
somewhat narrower than claimed. Empirical scholars can frame their conclusions
explicitly in terms of shareholder wealth rather than overall firm value or societal
efficiency, and indeed, a few scholars have done so. One example is the work by Rob
Daines and Michael Klausner analyzing the effect of antitakeover protection in IPO

property taxes that they pay, the services they provide, even the charitable activities in which they engage. The
range of stakeholders and scope of interests that should be taken into account in assessing firm value is a matter
of some debate.
37. See, e.g., Mark Klock et al., Tobin's q and Measurement Error: Caveat Investigator, 43 J. ECON. &
BUS. 241, 245 (1991) (identifying a method of constructing imputed value for privately placed debt to refine a
Tobin’s Q calculation).
38. Disclosure laws, which are oriented in terms of shareholder wealth, could be modified to increase the
transparency of other components of firm value. See Marleen O’Connor, Rethinking Corporate Financial
Disclosure of Human Resource Values for the Knowledge-Based Economy, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 527
(1998) (advocating the revision of accounting procedures to increase disclosure of human resource values); see
also Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Contestable Claims of Shareholder Wealth Maximization: Evidence from the
Airline Industry (Nov. 25, 2002) (unpublished paper) (developing a market-based measure of the value of
labor).
39. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J.
439, 441-42 (2001) (arguing that shareholder value is the normatively appropriate focus of corporate law and
that the interests of other corporate stakeholders are better addressed through other bodies of law such as labor
law, consumer law, and so forth); Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business: Stakeholders and
Corporate Governance at the End of History, 67 CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 132 (2004) (detailing extensive
stakeholder protection through the broader law of business but terming the distinction between corporate law
and other business law “artificial”).
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charter provisions. 40 Although their paper title poses the question in terms of “firm
value,” Daines and Klausner make clear in the body of the paper that the focus of their
analysis is shareholder wealth. Importantly, the authors explicitly recognize the
distinction between maximization of shareholder wealth and efficiency, identifying the
possibility that antitakeover provisions may protect management private benefits at the
expense of shareholders. 41
Legal research that examines the impact of regulatory change on shareholder value
is valuable. Relatedly, such research can be defended on normative grounds as focused
upon the core subject of corporate law. Clark argued, for example, that corporate law and
securities regulation “are simply defined to deal only with the relationships between
shareholders and managers.” 42 Empirical studies should, however, be clear about the
scope of any efficiency claims based on such analysis. Alternatively, researchers who
seek broader efficiency implications may need to counteract the lamplight effect and
expand their data collection.
As to the argument that shareholder wealth serves as a legitimate proxy for firm
value, this claim is at least partially true. On many issues, the interests of multiple
corporate stakeholders are aligned. 43 Indeed, as Clark recognized, there is also
considerable overlap between firm interests and societal interests. Clark described the
monist viewpoint as the claim that, in the long run, there is an identity between public
and corporate interests. 44 Charles Wilson put it in somewhat different terms: “What was
good for our country was good for General Motors, and vice versa.” 45
Surprisingly, little research demonstrates a correlation between doing well and doing
good, that is, a correlation between corporate performance and decisions that favor the
interests of nonshareholder stakeholders or the public at large. 46 Despite the existence of
an extensive literature arguing for increased corporate social responsibility, there is scant
evidence that corporate decisions favoring the interests of workers, customers, or the
community actually increase the size of the pie, as opposed to reflecting transfers of

40. Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection
in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83 (2001).
41. See id. at 110-12 (characterizing efficiency in terms of the sum of share value and private benefits to
management).
42. CLARK, supra note 1, at 30.
43. In addition, shareholders may also be creditors, customers, and employees, leading them to care about
the effects of corporate conduct on nonshareholder constituencies. See, e.g., Roger H. Gordon, Do Publicly
Traded Corporations Act in the Public Interest?, 3 ADVANCES ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1 (2003) (describing
how shareholder interests may extend beyond share price).
44. CLARK, supra note 1, at 681.
45. Nomination of Charles Wilson for Secretary of Defense Before the S. Armed Servs. Comm., 83d Cong.,
1st Sess., 26 (1953).
46. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. GARONE, THE LINK BETWEEN CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP AND FINANCIAL
PERFORMANCE (1999) (finding inconclusive evidence demonstrating that good corporate citizenship improves
financial performance); WALKER INFO., INC., MEASURING THE BUSINESS VALUE OF CORPORATE
PHILANTHROPY
6
(2000),
available
at
http://www.cof.org/files/Documents/Corporate_Grantmaking/Measurement/Measuring_the_Business_Value_of
_Corp_Phil-Executive_Summary.pdf (summarizing the literature and finding that “[e]mpirical research on the
relationship between corporate citizenship and corporate financial performance has yet to prove a conclusive
link”).
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wealth from one group of stakeholders to another. 47 To the extent that researchers are
relying on shareholder wealth as a proxy for firm or societal value, empirical evidence
documenting the relationship would be helpful.
Even if the interests of corporate stakeholders are, in many cases, aligned,
sometimes they are not. In at least a subset of corporate decisions, there is a true conflict
between the interests of different stakeholders, and a decision that benefits one class of
stakeholders will harm another. Moreover, many of the corporate rules upon which
empirical research is focused are addressed to these types of intra-capital structure
battles. Takeover regulation, the scope of director and officer liability, board structure,
and executive compensation all have the potential to affect wealth transfers between
stakeholders. The decision to evaluate these rules exclusively in terms of shareholder
wealth requires normative justification for favoring shareholder interests, at the expense
of other stakeholders.
The implicit assumption then, in existing empirical research, is that the shareholder
primacy norm permits or requires empirical scholars to define efficiency in corporate law
exclusively in terms of shareholder wealth. Is such a claim justified? Answering this
question requires a more careful analysis of the basis for the shareholder primacy norm
and the extent to which it constrains corporate decision-making, an analysis to which this
Article turns in the next part.
III. THE SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY NORM
A. Origins of the Norm
1. The Berle-Dodd Debate
Shareholder primacy, the obligation of corporate decision-makers to focus on
shareholder interests, is a dominant principle in corporate law. 48 The American Law
Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance state “a corporation . . . should have as its
objective the conduct of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and
47. See Anant K. Sundaram & Andrew C. Inkpen, The Corporate Objective Revisited, 15 ORG. SCI. 350,
353 (2004) (reviewing extensive literature attempting to link stakeholder management with performance and
concluding that empirical results fail to support such a relationship); see also Mark S. Klock et al., Does
Corporate Governance Matter to Bondholders?, 40 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 693 (2005) (concluding that
antitakeover provisions, although not beneficial to shareholders, are valued by creditors); Olubunmi Faleye et
al., When Labor Has a Voice in Corporate Governance (2004) (unpublished paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=498962 (finding that favoring labor interests is inconsistent with shareholder
value maximization); Henrik Cronqvist et al., Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More? (Dec. 2,
2005) (unpublished paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=845844 (finding that, as a result of agency
problems, entrenched managers pay higher wages, benefiting workers at the expense of shareholders). But see
Wayne F. Cascio, Downsizing: What Do We Know? What Have We Learned?, 7 ACAD. MGMT. EXEC. 95
(1993) (finding that, contrary to management claims, corporate downsizing was associated with lower long term
stock performance).
48. See, e.g., John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm Shareholder Model
of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1313, 1326 (1992) (stating that “the fundamental goal of corporate
law is so theoretically and historically obvious that it need not be explicated: the goal is to maximize
corporate—and thus shareholder—welfare”).

FISCH FINAL.DOC

2006]

9/1/2006 11:00:24 AM

Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law

647

shareholder gain.” 49 Although some scholars, most notably progressive scholars, have
questioned whether the norm is either descriptively accurate or normatively appropriate,
the vast majority of commentators accept the premise that the primary objective of the
corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth. 50
The origins of the shareholder primacy norm can be found in the classic debate
between Merrick Dodd and Adolf Berle in the 1930s, which took place at the time when
the U.S. corporation was expanding from an organizational form used primarily for
public work—building and operating railroads, ferry services, bridges, and the like—to
the foundational form for private business enterprise. Berle and Dodd were actually
debating two questions—how properly to characterize the developing structure of
corporate law and, relatedly, how corporate law should develop in the future. Thus Berle,
who espoused the conception of shareholder primacy in the debate, argued that corporate
law was essentially a variant of trust law, in which corporate managers owed fiduciary
duties to manage the corporation in the interests of the shareholder-beneficiaries. 51
Berle’s claim was primarily descriptive: “[A]ll powers granted to a corporation or to the
management of a corporation . . . are . . . exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all
shareholders as their interest appears.” 52 Berle’s argument was premised on the
conception of shareholders as owners of the corporation. Managers’ obligations to
shareholders stem from their role as trustees or agents for these owners. Berle’s rationale
for drawing upon the law of trusts was to constrain management discretion, which he
viewed as leading to self-dealing, by interposing fidelity to shareholders as a requirement
for legitimacy.
Dodd responded with the essentially normative and largely aspirational argument
that expanded the trust conception of corporate managers by extending their obligations
to a wider set of beneficiaries. Dodd argued that managers “should concern themselves
with the interests of employees, consumers, and the general public, as well as of the
stockholders.” 53 Dodd sought to distance corporate or business law from private law,
claiming that public opinion was moving the law toward a view in which the business
corporation has “a social service as well as a profit-making function.” 54
Berle’s response to this argument was pragmatic. 55 As he explained, increasing
managerial discretion reduced managerial accountability. Moreover, managers could not
feasibly be held accountable to employees, creditors, or the general public, as Dodd had
proposed. Consequently, Berle stated: “When the fiduciary obligation of the corporate
management and ‘control’ to stockholders is weakened or eliminated, the management
and ‘control’ become for all practical purposes absolute.” 56
The Berle-Dodd debate was, in reality, less of a debate than commentators typically
49. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§2.01(a) (1994).
50. But see William W. Bratton, Confronting the Ethical Case Against the Ethical Case for Constituency
Rights, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1449, 1456 (1993) (noting that under the ALI principles “maximization
language is eschewed in favor of an equivocal directive to ‘enhance’”).
51. Adolf Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1074 (1931).
52. Id. at 1049.
53. Merrick Dodd, For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1156 (1932).
54. Id. at 1148.
55. Adolf Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932).
56. Id. at 1367.
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suggest. In 1942, Dodd acknowledged various legal and practical obstacles to treating
corporate managers as trustees for workers and consumers and conceded that it was
misleading to characterize the relationship between managers and nonshareholder
constituencies in terms of a trust. 57 In turn, Berle subsequently conceded that, at least as
a descriptive matter, corporate law came to adopt Dodd’s position, granting managers
wide discretion to manage the corporation in the general interests of society. 58 In other
words, both Berle and Dodd distinguished the legal obligations of managers to
shareholders from their obligations to other stakeholders but, at the same time,
acknowledged the legitimacy of other stakeholder interests.
2. Shareholders as Owners
Berle’s trusteeship argument was based, at its core, on the legal status of
shareholders as owners of the corporation. This view led Berle famously to characterize
the public corporation in terms of the separation of ownership and control. 59 The
characterization of shareholders as owners persists in case law and scholarship. 60 For
example, the Delaware Supreme Court explained:
One of the fundamental tenets of Delaware corporate law provides for a
separation of control and ownership. The board of directors has the legal
responsibility to manage the business of a corporation for the benefit of its
shareholder owners. 61
Similarly, Chancellor Allen has recognized the “traditional model of the nature of
the corporation that sees shareholders as ‘owners.’” 62 The model of shareholders as
owners or principals leads to the argument that the corporation should be managed in
their interests. Thus Milton Friedman argued that corporate executives did not have the
authority to sacrifice maximization of profits in favor of social responsibility because the
executives were merely employees of the owners of the business, the shareholders. 63

57. E. Merrick Dodd, Book Review, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 538, 547 (1942) (reviewing MARSHALL E. DIMOCK
& HAROLD K. HYDE, BUREAUCRACY AND TRUSTEESHIP IN LARGE CORPORATIONS (1940)).
58. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, supra note 39, at 444 n.6 (describing Berle’s subsequent
statements on the issue); see also Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Foreword, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY xii,
ix-xv (Edward S. Mason ed., 1959) (conceding that corporate law had developed to be consistent with Dodd’s
position but maintaining his misgivings about whether this was the “‘right’ disposition”).
59. See ADOLF A. BERLE JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 9 (1932) (referring to shareholders as “owners” and noting that corporate governance must focus on
the problems caused by the separation of ownership and control).
60. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the
Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 825-26 (1999) (identifying various reasons why shareholders
should be characterized as owners of the corporation). Prominent economists have also characterized
shareholders as owners, by virtue of their status as residual claimants and suppliers of physical capital. See, e.g.,
Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral
Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 695 (1986); Oliver Hart, An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the
Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1765-66 (1989); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of
the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1119-20 (1990).
61. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998).
62. Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1124 (Del. Ch. 1990).
63. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
13, 1970 (Magazine), at 32.
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Deeming shareholders to be the owners of the corporation has led to the
characterization of the shareholder’s interest in terms of property rights. 64 Describing the
corporation as shareholder property is a powerful rhetorical device, because property
rights convey a sense of absolutism. Thomas Grey explains, “To own property is to have
exclusive control of something—to be able to use it as one wishes, to sell it, give it away,
leave it idle, or destroy it.” 65 Indeed, at least one scholar has argued that corporate
constituency statutes, which authorize managers to consider nonshareholder interests,
may constitute unconstitutional takings by virtue of the fact that they diminish the
shareholders’ property interests in the corporation. 66
The characterization of shareholders as legal owners has been widely criticized. 67
Lynn Stout calls it “the worst[] of the standard arguments for shareholder primacy.” 68
Critics argue that there are substantial legal and practical differences between
shareholders and traditional property owners. 69 From a legal perspective, shareholders
own stock, which gives them claims to certain control and financial rights within the
corporation but not direct control over or even access to the firm’s underlying assets.
Other stakeholders, including creditors, options holders, and managers have claims to
different control and financial rights. Corporate managers, unlike traditional agents, are
not directly controlled by their principals in that the source of their power is largely
statutory. From a practical perspective, shareholders also do not resemble traditional
owners. They are a fluid and fluctuating group of investors, many of whom hold only
short-term interests, and perhaps most importantly, they do not exercise the control
associated with traditional property rights. Berle and Means themselves argued that
shareholders “by surrendering control and responsibility over the active property . . .
surrender[] the right that the corporation should be operated in their sole interest, . . .
[and] release[] the community from the obligation to protect them to the full extent
implied in the doctrine of strict property rights.” 70
It is not clear, however, that these arguments effectively defeat the ownership
characterization. Property scholars have largely rejected the absolutist view of property
rights, recognizing that such rights can be divisible, shared, and contingent. 71 Melvin
Eisenberg observes that “life interests, remainder interests, and easements are property
rights, not contractual rights, even though they lack some of the standard incidents of
64. David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 230-31 (1991) (explaining the idea
that shareholders hold corporations as property).
65. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII, at 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John
W. Chapman eds., 1980).
66. Lynda J. Oswald, Shareholders v. Stakeholders: Evaluating Corporate Constituency Statutes Under
the Takings Clause, 24 J. CORP. L. 1, 2-3 (1998).
67. Contractarians reject the view of shareholders as owners, characterizing their claims as merely
contractual. Eisenberg, supra note 60, at 825. Communitarians similarly reject shareholders as owners of the
corporation. Id.
68. Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189,
1190 (2002).
69. See, e.g., MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 4-5 (1995) (describing as misleading the characterization of shareholders as
owners).
70. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 59, at 355-56.
71. See, e.g., A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A.G. Guest ed.,
1961) (describing the concept of split ownership).
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ownership.” 72 Moreover, the fact that shareholders may be characterized as owners does
not resolve the question of whether other corporate stakeholders can also claim an
ownership interest in the corporation. Indeed, property law frequently concerns conflicts
in which holders of differing interests in the same asset seek to control or use the asset in
ways that interfere with the each other’s legally protected interests. 73 As Joseph Singer
explains, “In these cases, title and ownership are not helpful ways to conceptualize the
dispute.” 74
Moreover, the scope of property rights does not flow automatically from an
ownership interest but is a function of underlying political and economic forces. The
possession of a property interest in an asset does not resolve one’s rights to use or control
the asset. As Joan Williams explains, “labeling something as property does not
predetermine what rights an owner does or does not have in it.” 75 Thus, despite its
appeal, the characterization of a corporation as property doesn’t tell us which
stakeholders may be deemed to possess an ownership interest; nor does it tell us the legal
rights associated with that interest. While ownership rights may be a consequence of
shareholder primacy, they do not justify shareholder primacy.
Ultimately, the Berle-Dodd debate and the rhetoric of shareholder ownership offer
insights into the historical foundations of the shareholder primacy norm, but neither
provides a convincing justification for defining the corporate objective exclusively in
terms of shareholder wealth. A potential alternative is existing law. In the next section,
this Article explores the extent to which existing law requires managers to focus
exclusively on shareholder wealth.
B. Shareholder Primacy and Existing Law
Commentators widely recognize that shareholder primacy functions more as a norm
than an enforceable legal rule. 76 Although corporate law mandates managerial fidelity to
shareholder interests both through shareholder election rights and through fiduciary
principles, existing law does not actually require officers and directors to make
operational decisions with the sole objective of shareholder wealth maximization.
The high point of shareholder primacy as a legal mandate was the Michigan
Supreme Court’s 1919 decision in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 77 in which the court struck
down Henry Ford’s plan to use surplus earnings to reduce car prices rather than distribute
those earnings to shareholders. The court explained: “A business corporation is organized
and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.” 78 The modern counterpart of

72. Eisenberg, supra note 60, at 825.
73. Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW.
U. L. REV. 1283, 1455-56 (1996) (describing how “many disputes about property involve conflicts among title
holders”).
74. Id. at 1456.
75. Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 297 (1998).
76. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law Symposium: Introduction, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1611 (2001) (introducing a symposium exploring “the complex relationship between legal
and nonlegal enforceability, between ‘law’ and ‘norms’”); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm,
23 J. CORP. L. 277, 278 n.1 (1998) (describing the use of the term “shareholder primacy norm”).
77. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
78. Id. at 684.
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Dodge v. Ford is the Delaware Supreme Court’s Revlon decision. 79 In Revlon, the court
held that “concern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among
active bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is to protect or maintain the
corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder.” 80 Rather, the directors were
required, in that context, to maximize shareholder value.
Importantly, however, even in these cases, the directors’ duty to maximize
shareholder wealth is limited. Although Dodge v. Ford is frequently cited, no modern
court has struck down an operational decision on the ground that it favors stakeholder
interests over shareholder interests. Indeed, some commentators argue that Dodge’s
holding is limited to the close corporation context, and rather than defining appropriate
corporate objectives, the case should be understood as a precursor to the modern doctrine
of shareholder oppression. 81 The Revlon decision is limited to the corporate control
context and, even within that context, applies to an extremely small set of cases. The
court in Revlon explicitly noted that the inevitability of a cash sale changed the role of the
directors “from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers.” 82
Perhaps more significantly, the Revlon court explained that when the board decided
to put the company up for sale, its duty “changed from the preservation of Revlon as a
corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the
stockholders’ benefit.” 83 In other words, even in the takeover context, so long as the
company has not entered the Revlon mode, Delaware law permits directors to consider
the interests of “creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community
generally.” 84 As the Delaware Supreme Court explained subsequent to the Revlon
decision in Paramount v. Time, “[A] board of directors . . . is not under any per se duty to
maximize shareholder value.” 85 Indeed, the Delaware courts have gone so far as to
conclude that a board may take actions that affirmatively disadvantage shareholders if the
board can justify those actions. 86
Had Oracle and PeopleSoft not resolved their recent takeover dispute, the Delaware
courts might have had occasion to consider the question of whether an issuer can protect
stakeholder interests at the expense of the shareholders. After Oracle made its takeover
bid, PeopleSoft began including “customer assurance” provisions in its contracts that
entitled customers to substantial damages if a buyer acquired PeopleSoft and stopped
servicing the customers. 87 The provisions had the effect of making a takeover more

79. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
80. Id. at 182.
81. Smith, supra note 76, at 322-23; Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A
Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 256-57 (1999).
82. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
85. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).
86. See Orban v. Field, No.12820, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 277, at *27 (Dec. 30, 1993) (recognizing the
general principle that “if directors take action directed against a class of securities they should be required to
justify it”); see also Blackmore Partners, LP v. Link Energy, LLC, 864 A.2d 80, 86 (Del. Ch. 2004) (concluding
that directors who approved a distribution of 100% of a solvent company’s assets to creditors, wiping out all
value for the equity holders, may be required to justify their actions).
87. See, e.g., David Marcus, Delaware to See Oracle-PeopleSoft Dispute, THE DEAL, Oct. 4, 2004,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1096473931503 (describing PeopleSoft’s use of a “customer assurance
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difficult—thus hurting shareholders—at the expense of PeopleSoft customers.
In the operational context, the Delaware statute, which is generally described as
favoring the interests of shareholders more than the law of other states, does not
explicitly require that a corporation be managed exclusively or even primarily in the
interests of its shareholders. The Delaware statute provides that the directors, and not the
shareholders, have the authority to run the corporation and is silent both with respect to
the standard by which board decisions are to be evaluated, and with respect to the
stakeholders whose interests may legitimately be taken into account. 88 Delaware appears
to endorse the right if not the obligation of directors to manage the corporation as a legal
and economic entity. 89
The discretion afforded by the open-ended Delaware statute is increased by the
application of the business judgment rule. The business judgment rule provides a
corporation’s officers and directors with broad discretion to consider the interests of other
stakeholders. 90 Significantly, the Delaware courts have described the business judgment
rule as imposing an obligation to act “in the best interests of the company,” 91 not the best
interests of the shareholders. The scope of protection for board decisions is further
enhanced to the degree that the charter exculpates the directors for breaches of the duty of
care. 92 The combined effect of the business judgment rule and director exculpation
provisions is to limit most fiduciary duty claims to breaches of the duty of loyalty, that is,
manager self-dealing. Moreover, the courts have made clear that the shareholders do not
have the power either to make operational decisions or to impose their vision of the
corporate good upon a board that disagrees with that assessment.
Shareholders do, of course, have the power to exercise control rights under
Delaware law, most significantly, to elect the board of directors and to vote on certain
other corporate transactions. 93 Arguably, management accountability to shareholders,
through these control rights, should result in management decisions that maximize
shareholder value. Importantly, however, these control rights are not exclusive to

plan”).
88. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2005) (providing that the corporation's business and affairs “shall
be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors”).
89. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO
L. REV. 261, 276 (1992). It is important to note that this conception cannot readily be explained as simply a
“long-term” obligation to maximize shareholder value. Modern finance theory suggests that current stock price
should reflect the long-term benefits to shareholders of considering the interests of other corporate stakeholders.
See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247,
304 (1999) (rejecting shareholder long-run interest as an explanation for consideration of nonshareholder
stakeholders).
90. See Blair & Stout, supra note 89, at 306 (terming these “mixed motive situations” in that the board
may be benefiting other stakeholders at the expense of shareholders and arguing that courts generally uphold
such operational decisions under deferential business judgment rule analysis); Bratton, supra note 50, at 1457
(stating that the business judgment rule grants management “considerable latitude to derogate from the
shareholder primacy norm as it makes decisions respecting investment, financing, and operations”).
91. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
92. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (authorizing such exculpation).
93. Blair and Stout argue that shareholders enjoy voting rights “as partial compensation for . . . [their]
unique vulnerabilities,” which include lack of involvement in the corporation’s day-to-day activities, limited
access to information about firm operations, and collective action problems. Blair & Stout, supra note 89, at
314.
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common shareholders. 94 Preferred shareholders exercise control rights, and Delaware
law explicitly permits corporations to grant rights to creditors in addition to or even in
place of shareholder voting rights. 95
Additionally, shareholder control rights are limited and largely indirect.
Shareholders cannot initiate transactions or make operational decisions; their power is
limited to vetoing certain types of extraordinary corporate decisions such as mergers and
dissolutions. Similarly, while shareholders nominally have the right to elect directors,
their limited power over the nominating process and the corporate proxy machinery
prevent shareholders from using their voting rights to demand shareholder primacy from
directors. 96
In considering the protection of nonshareholder constituencies under Delaware law,
it is important to distinguish between two related concepts: the permissible objectives for
management decision-making and the enforcement of fiduciary duties. The Delaware
courts have explicitly rejected the argument that management has a fiduciary obligation
to other stakeholders at the expense of shareholders, 97 at least as long as the corporation
is not operating in the vicinity of insolvency. Consequently, stakeholders cannot initiate
litigation to require that management consider their interests. The fact that only
shareholders can judicially enforce fiduciary duties does not mean, however, that
directors must make decisions solely in the interests of shareholders, a point that will be
considered further in Part IV below. 98 Similarly, the cases that reject stakeholder claims
for breach of fiduciary duty do not forbid management from favoring stakeholder
interests; they simply provide that management’s failure to favor such interests is not
judicially remediable.
Although the shareholder primacy norm is used to describe corporate objectives
nationally, not just in Delaware, states other than Delaware have endorsed broader
conceptions of firm value for the purposes of managerial decision-making. 99 The
majority of states have adopted corporate constituency statutes that explicitly authorize

94. But see Eliasen v. Itel Corp., 82 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that “a corporate structure in
which the bondholders . . . have all the voting rights, and the shareholders . . . have no voting rights, is
anomalous”).
95. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 221.
96. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 89, at 310-12 (describing limited shareholder ability to use their
voting rights effectively); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW. 43
(2003) (identifying limitations in meaningful shareholder access and proposing remedies).
97. See, e.g., Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 303 (Del. 1988) (holding that a corporate bond does “not
represent an equitable interest in the issuing corporation necessary for the imposition of a trust relationship with
concomitant fiduciary duties”).
98. Indeed, as Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have observed, the law provides that the recovery in a
derivative suit that successfully establishes a breach of management’s fiduciary duty to shareholders is payable,
not to those shareholders, but to the corporation itself, where its benefits “accrue to all the corporation’s
stakeholders.” Blair & Stout, supra note 89, at 295.
99. Indeed, if one extends the analysis globally, the corporate laws of other countries expressly reject the
shareholder primacy norm. See, e.g., Peer C. Fiss & Edward J. Zajac, The Diffusion of Ideas over Contested
Terrain: The (Non)Adoption of a Shareholder Value Orientation Among German Firms, 49 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 501,
503 (2004) (“[T]he original German corporate law of 1937, which stated that the company was to be managed
for the good of the enterprise and its employees (Gefolgschaft), the common wealth of the citizens (Volk) and
the State (Reich).”); Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2072-75 (2001) (explaining the role of shareholder primacy in France and Germany).
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directors to consider the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders. 100 Although these
statutes were adopted in response to hostile tender offers and several are limited to the
change of control context, the vast majority apply to all operational decisions. In many
cases, the statutes explicitly provide that directors will not be required to regard the
effects of a corporate decision on any particular group—including shareholders—as a
dominant factor. 101 As former SEC Commissioner Al Sommer has observed, the salient
point of these statutes is that they define the best interests of the corporation in terms of
the interests of both shareholders and nonshareholder stakeholders, thereby omitting any
requirement that decisions favoring nonshareholder stakeholders be justified in terms of a
nexus to shareholder value. 102
It is true that the statutes—other than that of Connecticut—do not require directors
to favor other stakeholders, nor do they impose fiduciary obligations on directors in favor
of nonshareholder constituencies. 103 Nonetheless, the plain language of the statutes is
inconsistent with the shareholder primacy norm. In some cases, statutory provisions
extend even further. For example, the New York Business Corporation Law authorizes
corporations to make charitable donations “irrespective of corporate benefit.” 104 There is
also ample case law rejecting an affirmative obligation on the part of directors to sacrifice
the interests of other constituencies in order to maximize shareholder wealth. As the court
explained in GAF v. Union Carbide Corp., 105 the board must balance investors’ interests,
on the one hand, and “the legitimate concerns and interests of employees and
management . . . on the other.” 106 The point is not that constituency statutes prohibit
managers from maximizing shareholder value, but simply that they do not require it.
C. Shareholder Primacy and Business Practice
Terming shareholder primacy a “norm” implies that, as a practical matter, directors
seek to maximize shareholder wealth even if they do not face a legally enforceable
obligation to do so. Indeed, there are widespread claims that the shareholder primacy
model dominates the MBA curriculum and that the shareholder primacy norm is an
accurate description of business practice. Recent interview research conducted by the
Aspen Institute Business and Society Program, for example, found that the norm of
shareholder wealth maximization was implicit in most business school courses, and so
100. See Subramanian, supra note 34, at 1801 (identifying 31 states that have adopted corporate
constituency statutes).
101. See IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1 (2005).
102. A.A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty
Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 42 (1991).
103. The Connecticut constituency statute affirmatively requires directors, in the context of evaluating
certain corporate transactions, including mergers and other business combinations, to consider the interests of
nonshareholder constituencies. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756(d) (2004) (stating that “a director . . . shall
consider, in determining what he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation . . . the
interests of the corporation’s employees, customers, creditors and suppliers, and . . . community and societal
considerations”) (emphasis added).
104. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 202(a)(12) (Gould 2006). Similarly, the Delaware Supreme Court, in Kahn v.
Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 63 (Del. 1991), held that the appropriate standard to be applied in reviewing a corporate
charitable donation was whether the donation constituted waste.
105. GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
106. Id. at 1019-20.
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powerful that it did not need to be defended. 107
Other scholars have questioned the claim that the shareholder primacy norm
dominates business practice, however. After compiling website and survey data from
both U.S. and foreign firms, Petra Joerg, Claudio Loderer, Lukas Roth, and Urs Waelchli
found a surprising unwillingness of managers even to identify shareholder wealth
maximization as a priority. 108 Because talk is cheap, the authors concluded that this
finding reflects “a lack of commitment to the goal of shareholder-value
maximization.” 109 Similarly, Lisa Fairfax has found that corporations are increasingly
embracing stakeholder rhetoric 110 and that a similar trend is occurring in business school
curricula. 111
Stephen Bainbridge has argued that the business world itself seems to favor director
primacy over shareholder primacy. 112 Lynn Stout has identified a variety of standard
business practices—options repricings, retroactive increases in employee retirement
benefits, and corporate charitable contributions—in which shareholder interests are
subordinated to those of other stakeholders. 113 Daines and Klausner have even found
cases in which corporations in states that lacked statutory nonshareholder constituency
provisions, such as Delaware, adopted such provisions in their charters. 114
Performance-based compensation arguably creates the greatest incentive for
corporate decision-makers to focus on shareholder wealth maximization. The dramatic
growth since the early 1990s of performance-based compensation, particularly stock
options, would seem to provide circumstantial evidence that shareholder wealth
maximization has become increasingly important to management. Yet a careful analysis
of executive compensation demonstrates that, although stock options appear designed to
increase the correlation between shareholder wealth and executive pay, in reality pay has
largely been decoupled from firm performance. As Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried
explain, equity-based compensation plans that, in principle, were designed to align
management incentives, “have enabled executives to reap substantial rewards even when
their performance was merely passable or even poor.” 115

107. Mary D. Gentile, The Aspen Inst. Bus. & Soc’y Program, Corporate Governance and Accountability:
What Do We Know and What Do We Teach Future Business Leaders?, Address at the European Academy of
Business in Society's Third Annual Colloquium 3-4 (Sept. 27, 2004), available at
http://www.caseplace.org/references/references_show.htm?doc_id=306381.
108. Petra Joerg et al., The Purpose of the Corporation: Shareholder-Value Maximization? 23 (European
Corp. Governance Inst. Fin., Working Paper No. 95/2005, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=690044.
109. Id. at 24.
110. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate
Norms, 31 J. CORP. L. 675, 781-84 (2006).
111. Id. at 782.
112. Bainbridge, supra note 4.
113. Stout, supra note 68, at 1202-03.
114. See Daines & Klausner, supra note 40, at 97 (describing the adoption of explicit nonshareholder
constituency provisions or control share acquisition provisions by 14 of 52 IPO firms in their sample).
115. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 7 (2004). Moreover, there is evidence that strong performance incentives can
increase earnings management. See Marcia Millon Cornett et al., Earnings Management, Corporate
Governance, and True Financial Performance 17-18 (2006) (unpublished paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=886142 (finding that options based compensation increases earnings management and
that adjustments for likely earnings management may eliminate positive correlation between option
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Admittedly, managers frequently defend controversial business decisions in terms of
shareholder value. It is unclear, however, whether those statements are more than
rhetoric. Moreover, management public statements are directed to investors, who are
obviously highly concerned about shareholder primacy. Regardless of management
priorities, managers are likely to espouse investor concerns in investor-oriented public
statements.
D. Economic Arguments for Shareholder Primacy
Law and economics scholars offer a twofold normative defense of shareholder
primacy. First, they argue that, from a contractual perspective, shareholder primacy is
simply the objective to which the corporation’s constituencies have agreed. Second, they
argue that shareholder primacy leads to economic efficiency.
Contractarian scholars describe the corporation as a hypothetical contract in which
shareholders provide capital and other stakeholders provide other inputs, such as
labor. 116 Under a contractarian approach, the parties to the corporate contract are
understood to have agreed that the corporation is to be run so as to maximize shareholder
wealth. If the corporation is a private enterprise, the efficiency of corporate law should be
measured by the extent to which it maximizes the achievement of the parties’
contractually specified objectives.
The standard economic literature identifies two key differences between the rights of
shareholders and those of other corporate stakeholders. First, nonshareholder
stakeholders receive a fixed claim, while shareholders have a residual claim—they
receive the surplus. Second, the fixed claimants have priority over shareholders—the
right to have their claims paid in full—and shareholders receive what is left over after the
fixed claimants are paid.
Although shareholder primacy has not been formalized into an explicit contractual
term—either through legislation or in the corporate charter—these differences provide
justifications for viewing shareholder primacy as an implied term of the contract. First,
and foremost, a contractual right to receive surplus is of little value if managers have no
obligation to generate a surplus and are free to pay out all revenues to other corporate
stakeholders. Second, shareholder primacy is a partial substitute for the priority that other
stakeholders enjoy. In particular, shareholder primacy adds to the upside potential of the
residual claim, which compensates shareholders for bearing greater risk than fixed
claimants. Third, shareholders are passive investors. Through their control, other
stakeholders, particularly management, can protect their priority interests directly.
Fourth, shareholder primacy serves as a gap-filler. A contract that fully specified
management’s decision-making obligations with respect to shareholders would be
impossibly complex and arguably too inflexible to respond to developments in the
business world.
Finally, shareholders cannot withdraw their investment from the corporation without
substantial sacrifice. Managers, employees, creditors, and suppliers provide input to the
corporation on an ongoing basis. Thus market forces, in addition to contract terms,
compensation and performance).
116. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1418 (1989) (describing the corporation as “a complex set of explicit and implicit contracts”).
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constrain the corporation’s ability to exploit these stakeholders. In contrast, a shareholder
provides permanent capital to the corporation. Although shareholders can exit the
corporation if their interests are not adequately protected, they can do so only by selling
their shares to another investor, and the market price for those shares will reflect the risk
of shareholder exploitation. 117 As a result, they will bear the costs of misdeeds or selfdealing by other stakeholders even if they exit.
This effect is demonstrated in cases in which states have adopted extreme
antitakeover legislation. Several states have adopted antitakeover statutes that are widely
viewed as unduly interfering with the market for corporate control, including Ohio,
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. 118 Commentators widely agree that these statutes harm
shareholders by (1) reducing the ability of the takeover market to discipline management
decision-making and (2) making a takeover, with its likely premium for shareholders, less
probable. These effects are supported by empirical work that shows a negative impact on
stock price. The stock price of affected firms drops because the market anticipates the
effect of these harms on the future value of the stock. Significantly, however, existing
shareholders in these firms are the group that suffers the harm from the legislation.
Shareholders cannot avoid the harm through exit because, once the legislation is adopted
or even proposed, the price of existing shares falls to reflect the anticipated harm.
The extent of shareholder primacy supported by the contractual analysis is
somewhat limited. It can be argued that shareholders have bargained for a risk-adjusted
market rate of return on their investment, and that the terms of the corporate contract are
silent as to the appropriate allocation of any surplus. Contract theory suggests that
shareholders would not contribute capital unless operational decisions included a
shareholder value objective, but, in practice, shareholders are more likely to be concerned
with the level of return on their investment than their claim, relative to other stakeholders,
to the firm’s surplus. A firm with high fixed costs may allocate its entire surplus to
shareholders and still pay those shareholders a lower return than a competitor that gives
greater weight to stakeholder interests. In addition, as indicated above, the implicit
contract provides management with considerable discretion to choose among business
strategies.
It is important to distinguish the contractual argument from the normative argument
that shareholder primacy leads to economic efficiency. As Jeff Gordon explains:
Seen from an economic perspective, the goal of a system of corporate
governance is to maximize the economic value of the firm, as measured by the
total of economic returns for all possible residual claimants. For instance, the
goal is to maximize the sum of the returns for shareholders, debt claimants, and
workers. The ultimate defense of the assignment in the Anglo-American system
of exclusive governance rights to the stockholders rests on the empirically
contestable fact that this is how to maximize the size of the economic pie. 119

117. See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, Tender Offers by Controlling Shareholders: The Specter of Coercion and
Fair Price, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 83 (2004) (arguing that the market will cause the price of minority shares in a
controlled corporation to reflect the risk of self-dealing by the controlling shareholder).
118. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 13, at 1804-05 (listing states that have adopted “extreme takeover
statutes”).
119. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Deutche Telekom, German Corporate Governance, and the Transition Costs of
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At its core, the economic argument is based on a truism. If stockholders are the
residual claimants, by definition they receive the surplus that remains after all fixed
claims are paid. Maximizing this surplus means maximizing total firm value, assuming
that other stakeholder values remain unchanged. Consequently, maximizing firm value is
the equivalent of maximizing shareholder value. Law and economics scholars argue that
this approach gives residual claimants the appropriate incentives to maximize firm value.
This theory, in turn, leads to the argument for vesting control rights in shareholders.
Three components of this analysis deserve further scrutiny. First, is it true that
shareholders are the exclusive residual claimants in the firm? Second, is it possible to
maximize the value of the firm to the residual claimants without affecting the value of
other stakeholder interests? Third, does maximizing firm value lead to economic
efficiency?
As Amir Licht observes, the assumption that the interests of all fixed claimants, that
is, all nonshareholder constituencies, are fixed and well-defined, is unrealistic. Rather,
“the corporate enterprise comprises several constituencies whose interests are both
interdependent and indeterminate.” 120 Residual claimants are simply, by definition, those
who receive a share of the firm’s surplus. Shareholders are not the only stakeholders with
a claim to the firm’s surplus. 121 Indeed, nonshareholder stakeholders frequently have an
explicit contractual claim on a portion of the surplus. Creditors can receive a share of
profits instead of a fixed rate of interest. Managers and employees can receive
performance-based compensation rather than fixed salaries. 122 Customers can receive a
share of firm surplus through price cuts or rebates. Lynn Stout has argued that even
absent an explicit contractual claim to the firm’s surplus, nonshareholder stakeholders are
accurately described as residual claimants in the sense that they enjoy extra-contractual
benefits when the corporation does well, and suffer, along with shareholders, when the
corporation does poorly. 123
At the same time, options, warrants, and other derivative securities enable investors
to restructure the scope of the residual claim. Thomas Smith has argued that out of the
money call option holders, who have little more than a bet on the firm’s future stock

Capitalism, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 185, 197 (1998).
120. Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive Style, 29
DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 652 (2004).
121. Nor, perhaps, is it fully accurate to describe shareholders as residual claimants. Although shareholders
have a theoretical claim on the firm’s surplus, they have no actual entitlement either to the distribution of
surplus or to control the allocation of surplus between themselves and contractual claimants, outside the context
of bankruptcy. See Stout, supra note 68, at 1193-94 (“[A]s a legal matter, shareholders of a public corporation
are entitled to receive nothing from the firm unless and until the board of directors decides that they should
receive it.”).
122. Indeed, one might argue that the shift toward greater performance-based compensation for
management has converted managers into residual claimants, resulting in a form of managerial capitalism.
Performance-based compensation has, of course, been justified on the basis that it reduces agency costs and
properly incentivizes management to maximize firm productivity. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock,
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
871, 898 (2002) (describing the evolution of the poison pill together with shifts in executive compensation
during the period after the pill was developed); cf. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 39 (arguing that
managerial capitalism has been correlated with reduced productivity).
123. Stout, supra note 68, at 1194.
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price, are in fact the ultimate residual claimants. 124 In contrast, hedging enables a
shareholder to reduce or eliminate the scope of the residual interest while maintaining
shareholder status. Frank Partnoy describes a variety of financial innovations that have
led to the mutability of the residual claim, complicating the case for defining corporate
objectives in terms of the interests of the residual claimants. 125
Additionally, the scope of protection afforded to stakeholder interests depends on
the quality of contractual protection. As Jeffrey Gordon has observed, the relationship of
shareholder value to firm value is a function of the strength of the various markets in
which the corporation participates, including the capital market, the labor market, and the
product market. 126 Jensen and Meckling recognized that the nexus of contracts theory of
the corporation includes all the “owners of labor, material and capital inputs.” 127 The
failure of the shareholder primacy model to explicitly address stakeholder interests is
premised on the assumption that stakeholders are protected by contract. This assumption
proves problematic to the extent that stakeholder contracts are deficient. Indeed, scholars
have identified extensive evidence that stakeholder contracts are neither complete nor
perfectly priced. 128 Ramesh Rao notes, for example, that contracts with nonshareholder
stakeholders are often illiquid and lack both hedging options and market valuations. 129
George Constantinides identifies particular elements of the risk associated with an
employee’s investment in a firm—the risk of job loss is uninsurable, persistent, and
counter-cyclical. 130 To the extent that stakeholder contracts are imperfect or incomplete,
stakeholders may retain a residual interest as well as a fixed claim.
If the interests of fixed claimants are not fully protected by contract, increasing
shareholder value may not increase the size of the corporate pie. Although shareholders
can benefit from increasing productivity, they can also benefit by transferring value from
fixed claimants to themselves. Perhaps the most obvious type of transfer is increasing the
level of risk. Residual claimants may prefer excessive levels of risk in a corporation,
particularly when their expected return is small in the absence of that risk. 131 Because

124. Smith, supra note 81, at 260-61; see also Gregory Scott Crespi, Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary
Duties: The Inefficiency of the Shareholder Primacy Norm, 55 SMU L. REV. 141, 150 (2002) (stating “the most
residual claims are equivalent to barely in-the-money call options”). Smith’s claim might be stronger with
respect to warrant holders than for option holders. But see In re New Valley Corp. Derivative Litig., No. 17649NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 107, at *18-19 (June 28, 2004) (rejecting the argument that the warrant holder had a
comparable legal interest to a stockholder).
125. Frank Partnoy, Financial Innovation and Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 799 (2006).
126. See Gordon, supra note 38.
127. Michael Jensen & W.H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976).
128. See, e.g., Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and Economics of Collective Bargaining:
An Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U.
PA. L. REV. 1349, 1354 (1988) (explaining how, in internal labor markets, “a bilateral monopoly replaces the
textbook model of competitive supply and demand . . . [and] . . . asymmetric information and strategic behavior
allow for inefficient outcomes”). But see Daniel R. Fischel, Labor Markets and Labor Law Compared with
Capital Markets and Corporate Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1061, 1065-68 (1984) (identifying and rejecting
reasons why labor markets might be less efficient than capital markets).
129. Ramesh K.S. Rao, The Value of the Firm as a Nexus of Heterogeneous Contracts 3 (Feb. 1, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=624101.
130. George Constantinides, Rational Asset Prices, 57 J. FIN. 1567, 1575-76 (2002).
131. Thomas A. Smith, supra note 81, at 221-24 (offering an example of inefficiently risky investment and
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residual claimants are, in essence, gambling with value that would otherwise be paid to
fixed claimants, their interests conflict with those of other corporate stakeholders. 132
Even when a corporation is financially sound, increasing the level of risk to further the
interests of shareholders may harm other stakeholders. Greater risk may reduce the
creditworthiness of the firm and hence the value of its debt, or reduce job security,
thereby reducing the value of the firm to its workers.
If nonshareholders can be residual claimants or corporate decisions can transfer
value between stakeholders, then maximizing shareholder value is not the equivalent of
maximizing firm value. Careful economic scholars have made this point explicitly.
Michael Jensen, for example, observes that management is continually forced to make
tradeoffs among different corporate constituencies. 133 Jensen explicitly argues that firm
value should be defined to include “the sum of the values of all financial claims on the
firm—debt, warrants, and preferred stock, as well as equity.” 134 He then argues that
tradeoffs between other constituencies must be addressed by assessing their effect on
long-term firm value, with no stakeholder obtaining “full satisfaction.” 135
The relationship between firm value and social welfare raises another efficiency
question. Jensen explains that “200 years’ worth of work in economics and finance
indicate that social welfare is maximized when all firms in an economy attempt to
maximize their own total firm value.” 136 Others have questioned this claim, however,
identifying a variety of conditions under which maximizing firm welfare need not be
efficient. 137 A particular concern is that individual firm decisions may create negative
externalities. 138 Although the markets in which a firm operates may impose a certain
level of discipline, the extent of that discipline depends, again, on the quality of the
markets. For example, Mark Roe demonstrates that maximizing firm value will be
socially wasteful in the absence of sufficiently competitive product markets because
monopoly firms will sacrifice consumer surplus. 139 Scholars have debated, and will
continue to debate, the extent to which corporate laws, as opposed to other forms of
regulation, should resolve problems such as externalities and monopoly. 140 Nonetheless,

then extending the analysis beyond the “vicinity of insolvency”). Smith has also argued that the interests of a
modern diversified investor are more appropriate than those of a hypothetical long-term shareholder in defining
the firm’s objectives. Robert Monks takes a similar view in his conception of a “Global Investor” for whom no
societal effect is an externality. ROBERT A.G. MONKS, THE NEW GLOBAL INVESTORS: HOW SHAREOWNERS
CAN UNLOCK SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY WORLDWIDE 105 (2001).
132. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial Banking: A
Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan, and the United States, 48 STAN. L. REV. 73, 77 (1995)
(explaining why equity holders have an incentive to shift assets to risky investments and how this shift
constitutes a transfer of wealth from the fixed to the residual claimants).
133. Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function,
14 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 8, 16 (2001).
134. Id. at 8.
135. Id. at 16.
136. Id. at 11.
137. See, e.g., Thomas A. Smith, supra note 81, at 221 (arguing that “the shareholder value maximization
norm, if strictly applied, would require firm managers to make socially inefficient choices”); Stout, supra note
68, at 1197-98 (demonstrating how shareholder primacy can lead to inefficient outcomes).
138. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 38 (describing potential externality effect of firm-specific decisions).
139. Roe, supra note 22, at 2071.
140. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 133, at 17 (arguing that monopoly and externality problems should be
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to the extent that these problems exist, they temper the strength of the efficiency
argument.
One can defend shareholder primacy as an efficient decisional guide. A major
drawback to stakeholder theory is that it lacks a specific maximand to guide managerial
discretion. 141 To the extent that the interests of different stakeholders conflict, the
stakeholder model offers no principled basis for choosing among them. 142 In contrast,
shareholder primacy is said to offer management a way to evaluate decisions within the
framework of a single-valued objective function. As Michael Jensen has explained, a
corporate objective function that embraces stakeholder interests will likely result in
“managerial confusion, conflict, inefficiency, and perhaps even competitive failure.” 143
Here too, however, superiority of the shareholder primacy norm is overstated,
primarily because shareholders are not a homogenous group. 144 Within the shareholder
class, the investors vary considerably among such dimensions as the time frame over
which they invest, the extent to which they trade versus passively holding the
corporation’s stock, their degree of diversification, the extent to which they hold nonequity interests in the issuer, any option or other hedging positions that they hold, and so
forth. Scholarly commentary has recognized that the interests of short and long-term
shareholders may differ and that, consequently, they may prefer different management
decisions. Indeed, managers have criticized institutional investors for unduly
emphasizing short-term corporate performance. Scholars have also noted the conflicting
interests of current and future shareholders. 145 Options and other financial derivatives
further blur these lines, as they allow investors to refine the time period of their
investment and the scope of risk reflected in that investment. 146
The economic argument in response is that shareholder primacy is not defined by
reference to specific shareholders, but reflects the theoretical interests of a hypothetical
long-term equity holder. The problem, for both managers and scholars, is that absent
perfect market efficiency, short-term performance and value indicators, such as
profitability and stock price, may not accurately reflect the long-term value of operational
decisions. 147 Thus, if the notion of shareholder primacy is refined in this way,
shareholder primacy becomes less useful, both as a decisional rule and as a tool of
resolved by the government in its rule-setting function).
141. See Sundaram & Inkpen, supra note 47, at 354 (criticizing stakeholder theory for the idea “that
managers should juggle multiple goals in a complex hierarchy”).
142. See Jensen, supra note 133, at 13 (“Obviously any decision criterion—and the objective function is at
the core of any decision criterion—must specify how to make the tradeoffs between these demands.”).
143. Id. at 9.
144. Sundarum and Inkpen highlight the problem of heterogenous interests with respect to stakeholders, but
do not acknowledge that the same problem applies to shareholders. See Sundaram & Inkpen, supra note 47, at
353 (criticizing stakeholder advocates for ignoring the differences within stakeholder groups such as
employees).
145. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict Between Current and
Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1044 (2005).
146. See Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation, and the
Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1286-87 (1991) (arguing that financial innovation has
made the shareholder primacy norm “intolerably ambiguous”).
147. See, e.g., Michael L. Wachter, Takeover Defense When Financial Markets Are (Only) Relatively
Efficient, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 787, 798-800 (2003) (explaining reasons why stock price may diverge from firm’s
intrinsic value).
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empirical analysis. The consequences of this result will be explored in Part V below.
IV. THE SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY NORM AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES
A. The Scope of Fiduciary Duties
Although, as described in Part III, the shareholder primacy norm has limited effect
as a legal constraint on operational decisions, it nonetheless occupies a key role in
defining the scope of judicially enforceable fiduciary duties. Despite the protection of the
business judgment rule, corporate law limits management discretion through the
imposition of fiduciary duties: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.
Fiduciary duties operate as supra-contractual constraints on management decisionmaking by triggering open-ended judicial review. Cases on fiduciary duties are an
important source of law dealing with fairness, procedural protection, and the appropriate
balance of power among corporate constituencies. 148 Courts have generally described
fiduciary duties as running to the corporation and/or its shareholders. Nonetheless, the
right to trigger this judicial intervention rests exclusively with the shareholders. It is a
fundamental principle of corporate law that, absent extraordinary circumstances, 149
fiduciary principles do not protect nonshareholder stakeholders. Only shareholders can
bring a lawsuit to address a director or officer breach of fiduciary duty.
The argument that corporate law endorses shareholder primacy flows readily from
the legal limits on enforcement of fiduciary duties. By vesting shareholders with the
exclusive right to enforce these constraints on management, corporate law appears to
define the corporate objective exclusively in terms of shareholder welfare. This definition
has led stakeholder theorists or “progressive” corporate law scholars to criticize the
exclusion of other stakeholders from the protection of judicially enforceable fiduciary
duties, and to seek an obligation of management to consider stakeholder interests in cases
in which those interests conflict with those of the shareholders. Toward this end,
stakeholder theorists advocate the extension of fiduciary protection to nonshareholder
stakeholders. 150 In practice, this extension means expanded litigation rights.
Debate over the appropriate scope of fiduciary duties continues to flourish, and a
summary of the arguments is beyond the scope of this Article. Despite its claim that the
shareholder primacy norm reflects too narrow a conception of firm value, this Article
148. Importantly, the role of courts in articulating these rules is likely the most significant output of
fiduciary duty litigation, in that corporate decision-makers rarely face liability for a breach of fiduciary duty.
See Bernard S. Black et al., Outside Director Liability (Before Enron and WorldCom) (Stanford Law and Econ.
Olin Working Paper No. 250, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=382422 (“[O]utside directors of U.S.
public companies face a tiny risk of actual liability for good faith (non-self-interested) conduct, no matter how
careless or reckless they are.”).
149. Creditors are protected with fiduciary duties when the corporation is in the “zone of insolvency.” See,
e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank v. Pathe Commc’ns, No. 12150, 1991 LEXIS 215 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991)
(recognizing this protection).
150. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Bondholders and Debtor Opportunism: In Bad Times and Good,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1821 (1992) (arguing in favor of a fiduciary duty to bondholders); Marleen A. O'Connor,
Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced
Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991) (advocating a fiduciary duty to displaced workers in the context of plant
closings).
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does not challenge—and indeed endorses—the limitation of fiduciary protection to
shareholders. Rather, it questions the inference about the appropriate measure of firm
value that shareholder theorists draw from the scope of fiduciary duty. In the following
subsection, this Article identifies a new argument supporting the limited scope of
fiduciary duties—institutional specialization. This Article argues that the scope of
fiduciary duties is not a statement that shareholder interests should be privileged above
those of other corporate constituencies; shareholder interests are not the only interests
that count. Rather, fiduciary duties are a mechanism for allocating protection of
constituency interests through institutional specialization.
B. Institutional Specialization and Fiduciary Principles
Corporate law devotes its primary focus to the agency problems created by conflicts
of interest—conflicts between shareholders and managers, between controlling and
minority shareholders, and between shareholders and other stakeholders. 151 As Reinier
Kraakman and his co-authors explain, a core function of corporate law involves
minimizing “value-reducing forms of opportunism among the constituencies of the
corporate enterprise.” 152 Conflicts between shareholders and managers have dominated
the analysis. This is largely due to the paradigm-shifting work of Berle and Means in
identifying the agency problem of strong managers and weak dispersed shareholders
resulting from the separation of ownership and control in the public corporation. 153
Stakeholder analysis highlights a second conflict—between the interests of shareholders
and other stakeholders.
In corporate law, academic commentary has analyzed the relative merits of different
institutional mechanisms for addressing these conflicts. Most famously, in the classic
Cary-Winter debate over regulatory competition, former SEC commissioner William
Cary argued that the dominance of Delaware as a corporate domicile—and thus the
source of state corporate law for more than half of all publicly traded U.S. corporations—
reflected the appeal of Delaware’s law to corporate management. 154 Finding that
management power over the choice of domicile had resulted in a lax statute that failed to
provide shareholders with optimal protection from management malfeasance and selfdealing, 155 Cary called for the adoption of federal minimum standards of corporate
responsibility. 156 Cary’s conclusions were challenged by Judge Ralph Winter. 157 Winter
argued that various market constraints, including the capital markets, disciplined
managers and prevented them from exploiting shareholders through inefficiently lax
corporate law. 158

151. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 2 (2004).
152. Id.
153. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 59.
154. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 670
(1974).
155. Cary therefore termed regulatory competition a “race to the bottom.” Id. at 705.
156. Id. at 701.
157. Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
158. Instead, Winter argued, market discipline caused regulatory competition to produce a “race to the top.”
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The appropriate allocation of corporate regulation among different lawmaking
institutions depends on an assessment of comparative institutional competence. As Neil
Komesar demonstrated, comparative institutional analysis should consider the strengths
and weaknesses of competing institutional regulators relative to each other. 159 Komesar
argued that a choice among lawmaking institutions, such as Congress, the courts, and the
market, requires a careful examination of the particular characteristics of each institution
coupled with an assessment of that institution’s ability, relative to other institutions, to
achieve a particular policy objective. Factors that affect relative institutional competence
include the susceptibility of an institution to interest group pressure that may result in
minoritarian bias, the contrasting risk of majoritarian bias, transaction costs and other
factors that may impact the ability of those affected to participate in institutional debate,
and the complexity of the issues involved.
Because of the range of institutional players, comparative institutional analysis is
particularly applicable to corporate law. One study that applies the methodology,
although not the terminology, is Roberta Romano’s book, The Genius of American
Corporate Law. 160 Romano identifies a variety of institutional factors that make
Delaware institutionally superior, as a provider of corporate law, both to other states and
to the federal government. These factors include Delaware’s small size, its dependence
on franchise taxes, its specialized court system, and the role of its corporate bar. Romano
argues, for example, that Delaware’s dependence on franchise taxes causes it to be
responsive to the need for legal reform because of the significant cost of losing charter
business to other states. Both Delaware’s specialized courts and its unique corporate bar,
which plays a substantial role in revising corporate legislation, enable Delaware to
address the complexity of corporate law, and reduce the transaction costs of regulatory
change.
Romano’s work can be extended in two directions. First, it is worthwhile to look
more carefully at the institutions within Delaware and other states and to consider the
relative competence of courts, legislatures, and the market in supplying corporate law.
Second, these institutions can be evaluated based on their ability to protect particular
corporate constituencies. Comparative institutional analysis demonstrates that courts are
uniquely positioned to protect the interests of corporate shareholders. This insight, in
turn, explains the exclusion of nonshareholder constituencies from access to judicial
lawmaking as a mechanism for institutional specialization.
Fiduciary duties provide shareholders with access to the courts to challenge
management decisions. Why do shareholders need recourse to the judicial system to
address the management-shareholder conflict? A key reason is the limited power of
shareholders, relative to management, with respect to legislative lawmaking. Public
company stock in the United States is owned, directly or indirectly, by dispersed small
shareholders. 161 Small stakes and collective action problems limit the effectiveness of
Id. Judge Winter subsequently conceded the race to the top might, in fact, merely be a “leisurely walk.” Ralph
K. Winter, The “Race for the Top” Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526, 1530 (1989).
159. See generally NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994).
160. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993).
161. Even the growth in institutional shareholders does not change this, as most institutions such as pension
and mutual funds are simply vehicles through which small investors hold stock indirectly.
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investors to access the legislative process. Cost considerations, agency problems, and
their own political vulnerability limit the ability of even institutional investors with
comparatively larger stakes to overcome these problems. Additionally, because much
corporate law is enacted at the state level, shareholders lack even the minimum political
power that they might otherwise be able to exert through the voting process. Although
Delaware supplies corporate law to more than half of all publicly traded companies, few
investors have the power to vote on the election of Delaware legislators. 162
In contrast, corporate managers have significant advantages. Because lobbying,
testifying before Congress, and other forms of participation in the political process are
part of managers’ operational responsibilities, managers function as repeat players and
are able to draw upon their experience and reputations in the legislative process. 163
Managers have substantial firm-specific stakes that make political activity cost-effective
in contrast to diversified investors. Managers also control the powerful financial
resources of businesses, causing their interests to be of greater concern to politicians.
Corporations pay substantial yearly franchise taxes to Delaware—revenue that Delaware
risks losing if its corporate law fails to remain attractive to corporate management. 164
Through the consumption of legal services, corporations provide substantial revenue to
key interest groups, such as Delaware corporate lawyers. Managers may exploit their
firm’s political capital for their personal benefit. In particular, Romano notes that, in
addition to possessing higher stakes, managers can use corporate funds to pay their
lobbying expenditures. 165
Although the SEC appears to view its function as one of investor protection, similar
factors limit the SEC’s ability to address deficiencies in state law through its rule-making
authority. 166 An analysis of the SEC’s institutional competence is beyond the scope of
this Article, but institutional characteristics such as expertise, the potential for industry
capture, the extent of agency independence versus susceptibility to political influence,
and the explicitly and implicitly delegated scope of rule-making authority are all relevant
to this issue. Because interest groups such as managers, corporate lawyers, and securities
analysts are small in size and have concentrated stakes, they are able to dominate the
regulatory agenda and obtain legislation that favors their interests over those of dispersed
investors. 167 Romano identifies the Williams Act and mandatory disclosure as examples
162. In addition, as Romano observes, the “national political dynamic . . . favors managers” and
shareholders are likely to face greater collective action problems than managers in lobbying Congress.
ROMANO, supra note 160, at 76.
163. See generally Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV.
1495 (2005) (describing the role of political activity in business operations).
164. See Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 885, 888 n.8 (1990) (stating that, in 1990, franchise taxes accounted for approximately 20% of
Delaware’s general revenues).
165. ROMANO, supra note 160, at 76.
166. See, e.g., J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of Public
Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 321 (2004) (describing as “unsuccessful” the SEC’s efforts to compensate
for deficiencies in state laws concerning corporate governance).
167. Indeed, this dynamic may be responsible for the SEC’s repeated decisions to abandon its efforts to
provide direct shareholder nomination of directors. See Jayne W. Barnard, Shareholder Access to the Proxy
Revisited, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 37, 62-67 (describing the SEC’s consideration and abandonment of direct
nomination proposals); see also Fisch & Gentile, supra note 27, at 578-80 (describing a more recent SEC
proposal to allow shareholder nomination of directors).
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of this type of regulation. 168 Another recent example is the SEC’s proposal that
shareholders be granted access to the issuer’s proxy statement to nominate candidates for
the board of directors. 169 Despite widespread shareholder support, the measure was
ultimately blocked through a combination of direct management opposition and political
pressure. 170 In short, public choice analysis suggests that corporate legislation, state or
federal, is unlikely to serve the interests of investors relative to managers.
Similarly, to the extent that corporate law is addressed to intra-stakeholder conflicts,
shareholders are likely disadvantaged in the legislative process relative to other
stakeholders. Labor, suppliers, customers, and community members all have the ability to
participate in the political process. Other corporate stakeholders may have particular
advantages in political participation relative to shareholders. Their interests may be
aligned along a range of political issues. They may be repeat players. They may have
greater stakes. Union lobbying and the use of political action committees have enabled
labor to develop a powerful political presence. The Teamsters, for example, is one of the
most powerful interest groups in Washington politics. 171 Corporate creditors and
suppliers have the concentrated stakes and traditional resources of business interests. 172
Consumers have increasingly been able to exert political pressure through organizations
such as the AARP and through the potential voting power that they command.
Some commentators such as Romano and Easterbrook and Fischel rely on this
analysis to favor a market dominated approach in which investors have the option of
using the pressure of the capital markets to pressure issuers to modify statutory default
rules. There are reasons to believe, however, that the market based contractual approach
is better suited to serving the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders than to protecting
shareholder interests. Contractual modifications can be used to adjust risk, priority, or
fixed claims. Thus, employees might respond to a rule that reduced employee perks by
demanding higher cash compensation. Bondholders might respond to adjustments to the
takeover market by demanding the right to approve changes in control or providing that
such changes trigger a put option. Fixed claims also simplify a stakeholder’s monitoring
by reducing the task to determining adherence to the contract terms. The limited duration
of many stakeholder interests enables participants to adjust the contractual terms to
reflect interim legal or market changes at the time of new investments. At the same time,
most stakeholders can exit, either continuously or periodically, at relatively low cost. 173

168. ROMANO, supra note 160, at 78.
169. Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48-626, 2003 SEC LEXIS 2431
(Oct. 14, 2003).
170. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Rebuffs Investors on Board Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at C2
(describing the shareholder access proposal as “dead” as the result of pressure from the Bush administration and
corporate executives).
171. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 163, at 1522 (describing the political influence exerted by the Teamsters in
opposition to trucking deregulation).
172. Corporation statutes offer a variety of explicit protections for creditor interests such as restrictions on
dividend payments and personal liability of directors for approving an illegal dividend. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (2005) (requiring that corporations have existing surplus or net profits to pay dividends);
id. § 174 (imposing liability on directors for unlawful payment of dividends).
173. A stakeholder’s ability to exit is limited by the extent to which it has made firm-specific investments
that are incompletely protected by formal contract. The presence of such investments must be considered a
component of firm value in that they are valuable only if the firm continues operations.
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The value of the stakeholder’s investment is only affected to a limited extent by its
withdrawal from the corporation.
In contrast, the ability to use contract terms to adjust a residual stake is inherently
limited. By definition, shareholders receive what is left over after the fixed claims of
other stakeholders have been satisfied. If their legal rights are reduced relative to those of
other stakeholders, they will get less, but they cannot compensate for this by putting
themselves ahead or getting a bigger piece up front. Similarly, the value of exit to
shareholders is overstated. Although shareholders can exit an underperforming
corporation, in the absence of a fraudulent cover-up, the price at which they can exit will
reflect the corporation’s poor performance. Relative to an employee, who loses only the
value of firm-specific sunk costs, the shareholder loses more.
As I have argued elsewhere, there are reasons to believe that courts offer a superior
alternative to both the legislature and the market for the production of legal rules that
protect shareholder interests. 174 Courts are insulated from the financial and political
pressures associated with the legislative process. 175 Open-ended legal standards provide
judges with the flexibility to adjust their analysis to case-specific issues and enable them
to respond to innovations in business practice. The incremental approach of common law
adjudication permits courts to assess the practical consequences of corporate
developments such as poison pills, golden parachutes, and termination fees and to
respond accordingly. Moreover, the transparency of written opinions provides a level of
accountability. 176
In addition, shareholders have far better access to the courts than to the legislatures.
Representative lawsuits, such as shareholder derivative suits and securities class actions,
enable the small investor to obtain access to judicial lawmaking and allow the
aggregation of small investor interests into substantial stakes while, at the same time,
overcoming coordination and collective action problems. 177 Litigation maximizes
participation by shareholders in corporate lawmaking. 178 Specialized plaintiffs’ firms
address concerns about complexity in corporate law and, through their expertise, enable
shareholders to enjoy the advantages of repeat players in the litigation process. In
addition to their issuer-specific interests, shareholders benefit from the deterrent effect of
litigation on self-dealing and other misconduct by corporate officers and directors.
Experience supports the conclusion that judicial lawmaking is more responsive to
shareholder interests than the lawmaking of other institutions. Many of the most proshareholder corporate law rules have been adopted through judge-made lawmaking—the
auction requirement of Revlon, Unocal’s requirement of heightened judicial review of
management decision-making in the takeover context, and the various expansive
interpretations of the private right of action for federal securities fraud. Notably, where
legislatures have responded to these rules, they have cut back on shareholder protection.

174. See Fisch, supra note 19, at 1088-96.
175. Id. at 1092-93.
176. Id. at 1095.
177. Id. at 1090-91. Concededly, the collection of legal fees imposes substantial administrative costs on
representative shareholder litigation.
178. See Neil Komesar, Basic Instincts: Participation, Economics and Institutional Choice (July 8, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.wjsc.edu/ils/CIA-conference-papers.htm (highlighting
the importance of participation in evaluating institutional competence).
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Examples of these cutbacks include congressional adoption of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 179 which cut back on the imposition of fiduciary
principles through federal securities fraud litigation, the Ohio legislature’s rejection of the
Unocal standard of fiduciary principles in the takeover context, 180 and the adoption of
other constituency statutes by a variety of states to dilute the shareholder primacy norm.
These institutional advantages explain the role of the shareholder primacy norm in
defining the scope of fiduciary duties. Shareholder primacy has the effect of granting
shareholders, but not other stakeholder groups, access to judicial lawmaking. The
justification for granting courts a specialized role in protecting shareholder interests visa-vis those of other corporate stakeholders, is one of institutional competence. The
markets and the political process generally function well with respect to other corporate
stakeholders. Because the interests of managers, employees, creditors, customers, and
suppliers, are adequately protected through other institutions, there is little need for
judicial intervention. Shareholders, however, are relatively disabled from using these
institutions effectively. As a result, shareholder primacy affords shareholders access to an
alternative institutional actor: the courts. Fiduciary duty cases provide a mechanism
through which shareholders can trigger a lawmaking process that protects their distinctive
interests. Moreover, unlike the markets and the legislatures, the institutional structure of
the courts is particularly well suited to provide shareholders with meaningful access and
voice. 181
This analysis explains why fiduciary principles—and thus, judicial access—are
limited to shareholders. The reason shareholders are protected with fiduciary duties is not
because theirs are the only interests that count within the corporation. The interests of
managers, customers, and employees count, but those interests are protected effectively
through mechanisms other than fiduciary duty litigation. Indeed, at the point when
creditor interests are in the most jeopardy—when the corporation is in the zone of
insolvency—the courts have extended fiduciary protection to them. 182 As a result,
contrary to the claims of progressive scholars, the legitimacy of other stakeholder claims
does not justify the extension of fiduciary principles to protect nonshareholder interests.
Rather, the scope of existing fiduciary principles can be understood, and defended, as a
mechanism for institutional specialization—allowing the different institutions to serve the
interests of different corporate participants.
V. EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE
Robert Clark suggested in 1986 that it would be misguided to attempt to choose
179. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
180. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(C) (LexisNexis 2006) (rejecting Unocal and codifying the
existing common law).
181. Significantly, the market can protect the interests of future shareholders far more effectively than the
interests of existing shareholders. On the conflict between the interests of current and future investors, see
Schwarcz, supra note 145. As a result, legal doctrines such as the contemporaneous ownership requirement and
the standing requirement in securities fraud litigation constrain judicial access by such future shareholders in
favor of market remedies.
182. See, e.g., In re STN Enters., 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1985); Brandt v. Hicks, Muse & Co., 208 B.R.
288 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997). The creditor fiduciary duty cases, by precluding shareholders of a distressed
corporation from gambling with creditor funds, are inconsistent with a strong version of shareholder primacy.
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among the differing conceptions of corporate purpose, recognizing that each conception
has both strengths and weaknesses. 183 The emergence of empirical scholarship as a
dominating force in corporate law imparts new pressure upon any effort to remain
agnostic about the choice of corporate objectives. Efficiency analysis depends critically
upon goal specification. 184 As Susan Freiwald observes, “[s]eemingly minor variations in
goals lead to major differences in the analysis.” 185 Although Clark may have been able to
defer the question of whether corporations should attempt to maximize shareholder value,
firm value, societal value, or something else, for scholars seeking to evaluate and defend
regulatory policies, articulating and defending the choice of maximand is obligatory.
Researchers may argue that, given the difficulty of measuring nonshareholder
interests, shareholder wealth is an acceptable, albeit second best, proxy for firm value. 186
As indicated above, this approach is particularly problematic in that corporate law, at
least in part, is addressed to agency issues among stakeholders—allocating wealth,
power, decision-making, or other rights among various corporate constituencies. These
rules may have an overall effect on firm value—or they may not—but they also have
distributional consequences. When a rule affects the division of the corporate pie, its
effects cannot be assessed by measuring the size of a single slice. Although Coasian
analysis suggests that the participants in the corporate contract should, in theory, allocate
legal rights to maximize the overall size of the pie because the resulting efficiency gains
can benefit all constituencies, there are reasons to suspect that transaction costs may
impede such an allocation.
Several scholars have identified broader conceptions of firm value that could be
incorporated into empirical research. Thomas Smith has suggested broadening the
concept of shareholder value to investor value by including the market value of a firm’s
debt in empirical measures of firm value. 187 This broadening would enable an empirical
study to assess the effects of regulatory change on both shareholders and creditors.
Similarly Michael Jensen has suggested a definition of firm value that includes “the sum
of the values of all financial claims on the firm—debt, warrants, and preferred stock, as
well as equity.” 188 Although calculating this value is more complex than calculating a
firm’s market capitalization—the full extent of financial claims may include instruments
that are not publicly traded—this type of calculation is not unlike evaluations done for
purposes of credit analysis. 189 Extending the conception of firm value to include human
capital, Jeffrey Gordon is doing cutting edge work attempting to develop and apply a
methodology for measuring employee value that can be incorporated into firm value. 190
183. CLARK, supra note 1, at 702.
184. See, e.g., Komesar, supra note 178, at 15-16 (criticizing both economic and philosophic analysis for
failing adequately to define goals upon which their analysis is based).
185. Susan Freiwald, What A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Online Surveillance Reveals (Sept. 10,
2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.wisc.edu/ils/CIA-Conference-Papers.htm
(describing importance of goal specification in comparative institutional analysis).
186. See Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and Law & Economics: An Introduction, 73 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 3, 5 (1998) (explaining that it may be desirable to allow imperfect decision-makers to take approaches
that would not be ideal if those decision-makers were first best perfect).
187. Smith, supra note 81.
188. Jensen, supra note 133, at 8.
189. See also Klock et al., supra note 37 (suggesting a method for valuing privately placed debt).
190. Gordon, supra note 38.
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Finally, some scholars have identified the private benefits obtained by managers or
controlling stockholders as an independent component of firm value. 191 Attempts to
quantify these benefits are crucial for efficiency analyses in areas such as takeover
regulation or the recent Italian corporate governance reforms.
Modifications to statutory disclosure requirements could assist this effort. Existing
disclosure requirements are oriented in terms of shareholder value. Standard financial
statement disclosure focuses on indications of shareholder wealth such as net profits and
omits many components of value provided to other sources of capital such as creditors
and labor. Financial reporting requirements could also be modified explicitly to require
the disclosure of other elements of firm value such as charitable donations. 192
In addition, the shareholder-based measures of firm value used by empirical scholars
distort efficiency assessments because they do not generally reflect risk. 193 A
consequence is that evaluating shareholder primacy based on a measure such as stock
price or Tobin’s Q, may unduly emphasize risk-taking and disregard the effect of risk
management on shareholder value. 194 As one commentator observes, a low-risk
investment that produces a low return that is in excess of the investment’s cost of capital
does more for shareholders than a high-risk investment that produces a high return that is
below the cost of capital. 195
This observation is particularly important with respect to the extent that stock price
reflects returns to shareholders. In theory, stock price should reflect risk-adjusted
shareholder returns. Because two comparable firms can have different costs of capital,
one firm’s economic profit—the ratio of its return less its cost of capital to its total
capital—may differ substantially from another’s even if they produce comparable returns
to shareholders. True shareholder value should be measured in terms of the excess return
over the firm’s cost of capital. 196
The business world has developed a variety of tools to measure whether a firm’s
return on capital exceeds its cost of capital. 197 One of the best known tools for evaluating
firm productivity is economic value added (EVA). 198 Developed by New York-based

191. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and
Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 147-49 (1999) (noting the private benefits of control that may be enjoyed
by controlling stockholders or managers).
192. See Jill E. Fisch, Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder Litigation, 34 GA. L. REV.
745, 769 n.120 (2000) (describing proposed legislation that would have required disclosure of corporate
charitable contributions).
193. See, e.g., Wachter, supra note 147, at 802 (explaining that “abnormal returns are defined on a riskadjusted basis”).
194. See, e.g., Sohnke M. Bartram, Corporate Risk Management as a Lever for Shareholder Value
Creation, 9 FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 279 (2000) (defending corporate risk management
as a means of increasing shareholder value).
195. Leonard S. Hyman, Investing in the “Plain Vanilla” Utility, 24 ENERGY L.J. 1, n.1 (2003).
196. See, e.g., Pablo Fernandez, A Definition of Shareholder Value Creation (Apr. 27, 2001) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=268129 (defining shareholder value as a return that exceeds
the required return to equity or cost of capital).
197. A firm’s cost of capital is computed as a weighted average of its costs of equity and debt.
198. See Cyrus A. Ramezani et al., Growth, Corporate Profitability, and Shareholder Value Creation 6
(Mar. 21, 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=304880 (computing EVA as
NOPAT (net operating profit after taxes) minus WACC (weighted average cost of capital) multiplied by
capital).
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Stern Stewart, EVA is the net operating profit after taxes less a charge for the firm’s cost
of capital, a charge that reflects the opportunity cost of all capital, equity and debt
invested in the firm. 199 Stern Stewart describes EVA as “an estimate of true ‘economic’
profit, or the amount by which earnings exceed or fall short of the required minimum rate
of return that shareholders and lenders could get by investing in other securities of
comparable risk.” 200 Peter Drucker explains the significance of EVA as follows:
EVA is based on something we have known for a long time: what we call
profits, the money left to service equity, is usually not profit at all. Until a
business returns a profit that is greater than its cost of capital, it operates at a
loss. Never mind that it pays taxes as if it had a genuine profit. The enterprise
still returns less to the economy than it devours in resources. Until then it does
not create wealth; it destroys it. 201
EVA is not the only alternative measure of firm productivity. 202 The business
school and finance literature consider numerous alternatives 203 and there is an ongoing
debate over which measure is most appropriate. 204 Common to all these methods is the
recognition that, whether the goal is measuring firm value or identifying criteria to assist
managerial decision-making, there are shortcomings to using net income or stock price.
Commentators explicitly defend the alternative methods because they “measure
performance from a corporate finance perspective rather than shareholder wealth
creation.” 205 Significantly, studies have found substantial differences in assessments of
firm performance, based on the choice of methodology. 206
199. About EVA, Stern Stewart & Co. Homepage, http://www.sternstewart.com/evaabout/whatis.php (last
visited May 4, 2006).
200. Id.
201. Peter Drucker, The Information Executives Truly Need, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 59.
202. The chief competitor to EVA is CFROI, an inflation-adjusted measure of cash flow return on
investment, developed by HOLT Value Associates. Randy Myers, Metric Wars, CFO MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 1996,
at 41. A variant on CFROI is total business return (TBR), promoted by the Boston Consulting Group. Id.
203. Other business school measures include return on assets (ROA), market value added (MVA), and
shareholder value added (SVA). See, e.g., John Yozzo et al., Return on Assets: So Useful . . . and So Misused,
2001 ABA JNL. LEXIS 204, *2-4 (defining ROA as the product of total asset turnover and operating margin,
and distinguishing ROA, which is the return to all of a firm’s suppliers of capital, from net income, which
“belongs entirely to the firm’s shareholders”); Value Analytix, Strengths and Weaknesses,
http://www.valueanalytix.com/articles/strengths_and_weaknesses.html (last visited May 4, 2006) (describing
the basis of calculating SVA, EVA, and CFROI and describing the strengths and weaknesses of each
methodology). The finance literature uses additional measures. See, e.g., Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L.
Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 11 (Dec. 7, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=586423 (employing six different performance criteria “spread out across three
categories: operating performance, valuation and shareholder payout”).
204. See, e.g., Randy Myers, Measure for Measure, CFO MAG., Nov. 1, 1997, available at
http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/2990607?f=options (describing the controversy over which
performance metric is most useful); Alix Nyberg & Bill Birchard, On Further Reflection, CFO MAG., Mar. 1,
2001, available at www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/2991941?f=options (questioning whether EVA and other
value metrics are useful measures of firm performance).
205. See Ramezani et al., supra note 198, at 7 (applying this characterization to EVA and MVA).
206. See, e.g., Brown & Caylor, supra note 203, at 45 tbl.5 (finding differing results depending on the
choice of performance measure such that a firm may have good performance using one measure and poor
performance using another measure); Pablo Fernandez, EVA and Cash Value Added Do Not Measure
Shareholder Value Creation (May 23, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding a lack of
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The innovation in and controversy over performance metrics in the business world
suggest that measuring firm value and firm performance is complex. 207 One of the
reasons that the business world has been driven to search for better measures of
productivity is the recognition that stock price is a poor measure of firm value. Even in a
market that is relatively informationally efficient, it is unlikely that market prices reflect
fundamental value. 208 Noise may also reduce the informativeness of stock price reactions
to regulation. As Fischer Black has explained, an efficient market is “one in which price
is within a factor of [two] of value, i.e., the price is more than half of value and less than
twice value.” 209 The noise results, in part, from limits on the market’s ability to quantify
the effect of regulations on future firm performance.
In addition, as Michael Jensen has observed, the market can overvalue stocks. 210
The problem of overvalued equity highlights the potential operational damage that can
result from focusing on shareholder primacy. Jensen argues that when stock price
exceeds the firm’s fundamental value, managers will be pressured to make valuedestroying decisions—manipulating reported accounting figures or engaging in high risk
negative net present value projects—in an effort to maintain the inflated price. 211 Such
actions appear justified in terms of the shareholder primacy norm. As Jensen puts it, how
can managers argue to their board (or their shareholders) that “they must manage the
price of their stock down?” 212
Bill Bratton refers to these types of decisions as the “dark side of shareholder

correlation when measuring firm value, over a 10-year period, among MVA, EVA, NOPAT, and WACC);
Ramezani et al., supra note 198 (identifying differences in performance measures and finding that earnings and
sales growth are not correlated with shareholder value creation).
207. A complete analysis of this complexity is beyond the scope of this Article. An example is illustrative,
however. A Darden School case study of the relative performance of FedEx and UPS during the period 1985 to
1995 finds that FedEx’s financial performance during that time period was much worse than that of UPS.
Robert F. Bruner & Derick Bulkley, The Battle for Value: Federal Express Corporation vs. United Parcel
Service of America, Inc., UVA_F_1115, Darden School Case Study (July 1997), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=299291. In particular, the study observes that “[b]etween 1985 and 1994 FedEx
destroyed $1.36 billion in economic value while UPS created $2.08 billion.” Id. Based on these findings, the
study questions the rationality of the stock market valuation of FedEx. On the other hand, the cumulative return
of FedEx since its inception in 1978 has been over 9000%. FedEx Investment Calculator,
http://fdx.client.shareholder.com/calculator.cfm (last visited May 4, 2006) (showing that an investment of
$1000 in FedEx stock on April 12, 1978 was worth $91,638.67 as of Oct. 27, 2004). From 1999 to 2004, a
comparable investment in the common stock of each company would have produced a cumulative return of
107.65% for FedEx and 15.37% for UPS. Id. (calculating the return for an investment of $1000 from Nov. 10,
1999 to Oct. 27, 2004); UPS Investment Calculator, http://www.shareholder.com/ups/calculator.cfm (last
visited May 4, 2006) (calculating the return for an investment of $1000 from Nov. 10, 1999 to Oct. 27, 2004).
208. See Jill E. Fisch, Picking A Winner, 20 J. CORP. L. 451, 464 (1995) (explaining the difference between
informational efficiency and fundamental value efficiency); Lawrence H. Summers, Does the Stock Market
Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591 (1986) (describing evidence indicating the absence of
fundamental value efficiency).
209. Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 533 (1986). Black concedes that the factor of two is “arbitrary,”
but explains that it is “reasonable . . . in the light of sources of uncertainty about value and the strength of the
forces tending to cause price to return to value.” Id.
210. Michael C. Jensen, The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate
Finance, 10 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 549 (2004).
211. Id. at 555.
212. Id. at 562.
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value.” 213 Bratton identifies as one reason for Enron’s spectacular collapse its obsession
with meeting the short-term performance demands of its institutional investors. As Enron
stated in its annual report, “it was a company ‘laser-focused on earnings per share.’” 214
The implication of Bratton’s analysis is that shareholder primacy, aggressively pursued,
can be inconsistent with maximizing firm value and can, instead, lead to a “cultural
pathology.” 215 Importantly, to the extent that managers take on excessive risk or
manipulate their reported numbers in an effort to increase or maintain inflated stock
prices, these decisions impose an overall cost to the market that investors cannot
eliminate through diversification.
Empirical studies based on the shareholder primacy norm reinforce managerial
decisions to focus exclusively on measures of shareholder value such as stock price and
net profits. By endorsing regulatory and operational decisions that maximize stock price
without regard to the effect of those decisions on risk, sustainability, or other corporate
stakeholders, the studies risk legitimizing undesirable management behavior. Stock
options, phantom stock, and other equity-based forms of management compensation
increase the risk, as illustrated by the dramatic pay-offs that Enron executives were able
to generate by maintaining Enron’s stock price for just a few years.
In sum, focusing exclusively on shareholder wealth, and, in particular, on relatively
simplistic measures of that wealth, in assessing firm value is wrong. It is wrong because
shareholder wealth does not include the interests of other stakeholders. It is wrong
because shareholder wealth is ephemeral and not accurately measured through short-term
stock prices. And it is wrong because the focus on shareholder wealth encourages
operational decisions that may ultimately destroy firm value. As Richard Roll has
observed, “stock price increases do not necessarily imply increases in the economic value
of the total firm.” 216
VI. CONCLUSION
Law and economics scholars have embraced the shareholder primacy norm and
incorporated it into their empirical analyses of corporate law. As a result, studies
designed to evaluate the effect of legal rules that allocate power among corporate
stakeholders analyze those rules in terms of their effect on shareholder wealth. The result
is an increasingly influential body of scholarship that offers normative assessments of
regulatory policy based on measures of shareholder value such as stock price, net profits,
and Tobin’s Q.
This Article challenges the incorporation of the shareholder primacy norm into
empirical analysis. Shareholder value is neither the equivalent of firm value nor a
reasonable proxy for firm value, particularly when applied to the agency context upon
which corporate law is focused. Existing legal doctrine and economic theory do not
justify evaluating regulatory policy exclusively in terms of shareholder interests. Nor can
existing limits on the enforcement of management fiduciary duties be used as a basis for
213.
214.
215.
216.

William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002).
Id. at 1284 (citing ENRON, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2001)).
Id. at 1357.
Richard Roll, Empirical Evidence on Takeover Activity and Shareholder Wealth, in KNIGHTS,
RAIDERS & TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 241, 248 (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 1988).
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limiting the corporation’s objectives to maximizing shareholder interests. Instead, as this
Article has demonstrated, fiduciary principles are properly understood as a mechanism
for institutional specialization in the context of inter-stakeholder conflicts. Rules that
grant shareholders a unique degree of judicial access do not privilege the interests of
shareholders in the evaluation of firm value.
The measures of shareholder value typically employed by empirical scholars pose
additional problems. In addition to omitting the interests of other stakeholders, measures
of shareholder value such as stock price, net profits, and Tobin’s Q may be distorted by
market deficiencies and inefficiencies, risk, and noise. Furthermore, academic
endorsement of such measures—and short-term stock price in particular—as benchmarks
of efficiency may reinforce inappropriate managerial decisions. The extensive business
and financial research aimed at developing better measures of firm value and
performance should give pause to legal academics.
This Article does not make the normative claim that corporations should be operated
in the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders or society at large; nor does it support
expanding the scope of fiduciary duties to protect nonshareholders. Robert Clark’s
warning about the difficulty of defining the corporate objective continues to ring true.
This Article simply advocates caution in the use of shareholder primacy in empirical
research. Although future scholarship may demonstrate that shareholder value can
appropriately be used as a proxy for firm value, as yet, scholars have not made that case.

